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ABSTRACT
This Article proposes that dissenting Supreme Court Justices
provide cues in their written opinions about how future litigants can
reframe case facts and legal arguments in similar future cases to
garner majority support. Questions of federal-state power cut across
most other substantive legal issues, and this can provide a mechanism
for splitting existing majorities in future cases. By signaling to future
litigants when this potential exists, dissenting judges can transform a
dissent into a majority in similar future cases.
We undertake an empirical investigation of dissenting opinions in
which the dissenting Justice suggests that future cases ought to be
framed in terms of federal-state powers. We show that when
dissenting opinions signal a preference for transforming an issue into
an argument about federal-state power, more subsequent cases in that
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area are decided on that basis. Moreover, the previous minority
coalition is in the majority significantly more often, showing that these
signals are systematically successful. Not only can federalism-based
dissents transform the rhetoric of cases, they can systematically and
significantly shift the outcome of cases in the direction of the
dissenting Justices’ views.
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INTRODUCTION
Why do judges dissent? Legal scholars have long struggled to
answer this seemingly simple question satisfactorily. One traditional
legal view is that the dissenting judge is simply laying out an

BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC

10/6/2009 6:28:09 PM

2009] HOW THE DISSENT BECOMES THE MAJORITY

185

1

alternative theory of the law —but by definition, the court has
rejected that interpretation of the law. To the extent that we believe
the myth that judges discover the law, dissents simply represent
rejected dead ends along that path of discovery. A more public-choice
view is that dissents are an attempt to convince the majority of its
2
error. This could explain why judges circulate drafts of dissents—but
by the time of publication, dissenting judges have lost the fight. A
game theoretic twist on this view is that publication is necessary to
make those drafts credible threats. Under this theory, it is necessary
to publish even when the fight has been lost; otherwise, future threats
3
to dissent will not be credible. But that argument necessarily assumes
that dissenting is costly to the court, presumably by harming judicial
legitimacy and challenging the fiction of judges as apolitical

1. One judge described judges as having the “right and duty” to dissent and to “honestly
state[] the law and its application to the case as conscience dictates.” Michael Kirby, Justice,
High Court of Australia, Judicial Dissent, Address to the Law Students’ Society of James Cook
University at Cairns (Feb. 26, 2005), available at http://www.hcourt.gov.au/speeches/kirbyj/
kirbyj_feb05.html. There is dispute, however, as to the effect of expressing that disagreement.
For example, Chief Justice Taft described dissents as “a form of egotism.” He continued, “They
don’t do any good, and only weaken the prestige of the Court. It is much more important what
the Court thinks than what any one thinks.” Letter from William Howard Taft to Willis Van
Devanter (Dec. 26, 1921) (on file with the Library of Congress), quoted in Robert Post, The
Supreme Court Opinion As Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal Scholarship, and
Decisionmaking in the Taft Court 42 (UC Berkeley Pub. Law and Legal Theory Research Paper
No. 48, 2001), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=265946. In contrast, Professor Sunstein
argues that the potential of a colleague to dissent can “reduce the likelihood of . . . an incorrect
or lawless decision [and render a decision] more likely to be right, and less likely to be political
in a pejorative sense.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 184 (2003).
2. This analysis has been particularly well developed in the context of dissents from
denials of certiorari. Famously, Justice Stevens published an opinion in response to a dissent
from denial: “One characteristic of all opinions dissenting from the denial of certiorari is
manifest. They are totally unnecessary. They are examples of the purest form of dicta . . . .”
Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 944–45 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the
petition for writ of certiorari). Such a dissent, however, can have the benefit that it “sometimes
persuades other Justices to change their votes and a petition is granted that would otherwise
have been denied.” Id. at 945–46; see also H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA
SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 170–92 (1991) (providing interviews with
numerous Justices who describe using dissents from denial of certiorari as a method of
persuading fellow Justices to hear a case). For a discussion of different categories of dissent
from denial of certiorari—ranging from “neutral grounds” dissents, to “irredentist” dissents, to
dissents as forward-looking policy arguments—see Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari
Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1127, 1262 (1979).
3. Cf. LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 62 (1998) (noting in
the context of dissents from denial of certiorari that Justices must “[o]n occasion . . . publish so
that their future threats will be credible”).
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4

discoverers of law. Presumably, this harm applies as much to the
dissenting judge as to the majority judge, and so the theory cannot
5
really explain why two-thirds of all cases involve published dissents.
We propose an alternative theory: at least some dissents may be
explained as signals from judges to litigants about how to frame
future similar cases to increase the chance of success for the argument
the dissenting judge supports.
This will not explain all dissents. Sometimes dissents are simply
expressions of frustration or strength of feeling—as emphasized when
read aloud from the bench—or attempts to instigate a change of heart
in a colleague somewhere down the line. But when a dissenter
pursues an alternative line of reasoning as a means of deciding the
case differently, it can mean that the judge is doing more than simply
arguing the point. The act of publicly dissenting suggests that a judge
has not given up on the losing side of an argument; by continuing to
argue the point, the judge may be laying the logical groundwork for
future cases. Success in the form of the dissenter’s preferred outcome
eventually winning on the merits may only come when new judges are
appointed. But a more impatient judge may have another strategy
available. In dissenting, a judge may be attempting to summon
litigation with new case facts amenable to an alternative legal
argument, enabling the court to reach an alternative conclusion. In
other words, these dissents can signal how to frame future litigation to
create a more persuasive line of reasoning that encourages at least
some judges in the previous majority coalition to consider a different
argument when deciding on the merits. In this way, the dissenting
judge identifies a potential fissure in the majority coalition that can be
exploited by future litigants.
4. This is particularly relevant when judges occasionally emphasize their displeasure in
harsh terms, even though it is clearly too late to influence the decision—for example, by
extravagantly damning their colleagues. In response to his fellow Justices’ ruling that the death
penalty cannot apply to defendants with mental retardation, Justice Scalia awarded his
colleagues “the Prize for the Court’s Most Feeble Effort to fabricate” evidence for the
majority’s argument. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 347 (2002).
5. Between 1953 and 1985, 54 percent of cases had accompanying published dissents.
James L. Gibson, United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, Phase II: 1953-1993 Terms
(ICPSR Study No. 6987, 1997), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR06987. Dissents
appear to be on the rise. Between 1953 and 2000, the figure rose to two-thirds of cases. See LEE
EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS
227–31 tbl.3-2 (2007). Professor Perry details another disincentive for publishing dissents from
certiorari: Justices do not want the bar to know precisely why cases are granted or denied.
PERRY, supra note 2, at 174. This stands in stark contrast to our theory here, but because we are
attempting to explain some and not all dissents, both theories could be correct.
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This type of dissent signals potential litigants about alternative
routes to success. But to use this signaling effectively, the dissenting
judge needs a cross-cutting issue that can split the existing majority.
In this Article, we use federal-state disputes—which arise in a
significant number of cases in every substantive policy area—as an
example of such a cross-cutting issue.
Although views on federal-state power may correlate with
liberal-conservative division, a judge’s view on one may conflict with
6
the other. For example, in Gonzales v. Raich, Justice O’Connor
commented that she did not like California’s medical marijuana
policy and would not have voted for it as a legislator, but to be
consistent with her previous positions on states’ rights and restrictions
7
on congressional power, she voted to uphold the legislation. On the
other side of both issues, Justice Stevens said that Raich was one of
8
the two decisions he most regretted having to make that Term, but
that, to accord with his views of the broader federal-state principle, he
9
had to rule against a policy he agreed with.
In this Article, we test our theory of judicial signaling by
examining dissenting opinions that argue that the case should be
decided on the basis of the proper balance of power between states
and the federal government. To ensure that we are not confusing a
majority-splitting mechanism with a substantive federal-state issue in
the case, we look only at cases in which the dissent relies on federal10
state issues and the majority opinion does not mention federalism.
We show not only that such signals encourage more cases in the given
substantive policy area, framed in terms of the balance of state and
federal power, but also that this process is often successful: the
6. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
7. Id. at 57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“If I were a California citizen, I would not have
voted for the medical marijuana ballot initiative; if I were a California legislator I would not
have supported the Compassionate Use Act. But whatever the wisdom of California’s
experiment with medical marijuana, the federalism principles that have driven our Commerce
Clause cases require that room for experiment be protected in this case. For these reasons I
dissent.”).
8. The other case was Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
9. In an address to the Clark County Bar Association, Justice Stevens stated: “I have no
hesitation in telling you that I agree with the policy choice made by the millions of California
voters.” John Paul Stevens, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the U.S., Judicial Predilections,
Address to the Clark County Bar Association (Aug. 18, 2005), in 6 NEV. L.J. 1, 4 (2005). But
given the broader stakes for the power of Congress to regulate commerce, he added that “our
duty to uphold the application of the federal statute was pellucidly clear.” Id.
10. This ensures that we are not confusing a signal from the majority opinion, or a nonsignal, when federalism is in fact a determinant of a case’s outcome.
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previous dissenting coalition is more often subsequently in the
majority.
In other words, conservative dissents that mention that a case in
a particular policy area should have been decided on the basis of
federal-state power result in more decisions based on federal-state
powers. Moreover, those cases are decidedly more conservative. The
same is true with liberal Justices who mention federal-state powers in
their dissents. Their dissents result in additional cases in the same
policy area that are decided on the basis of federal-state powers, and
those cases become measurably more liberal.
This Article begins in Part I with case studies that illustrate how
the signaling process works. It then develops a more general theory in
Part II. In Part III, we test this theory using Supreme Court cases
11
between the 1953 and 1985 Terms. We establish that an increase in
dissents that mention federal-state power as the relevant issue when
the majority does not rely on federalism causes an increase in future
cases based on the balance of power between states and the federal
government. Then, by estimating the change in the ideological
placement between the initial set of cases in the policy area of the
signal and the later cases in that policy area, we show that these
dissenting signals actually transform past losses into subsequent
majority victories.
These results have important implications for how Justices can
shape their own agendas by communicating indirectly with future
litigants through their written opinions. The findings lay the
groundwork for more research in the area of understanding written
opinions as indications of Justices’ preferences and priorities.
Research in this area can help the extrajudicial community shape the
future of the Supreme Court’s agenda. We discuss these possibilities
in the concluding Part IV.
I. CASE STUDIES
In this Part, we provide a detailed case illustration in which a
dissent based on federal-state power is transformed into a majority
opinion in a subsequent permutation of the litigation. We then
11. We are limited to this time period because we use James Gibson’s Phase II Judicial
Database, supra note 5, for information on whether the authors of case opinions make
statements about whether federal or state powers are relevant to the opinion, for all majority,
dissenting, and concurring opinions. Unfortunately, Gibson has not yet updated his database,
but this limitation should not substantially affect our results.
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provide some more brief case examples in which the same
transformation occurs, but the subsequent litigation relates to new
sets of facts. These examples show that the judicial signaling with
which we are concerned can have a significant impact, in terms of
both the relitigation of specific case facts and, more broadly, the
development of doctrine.
A. The Trees Beyond the Forest: Federalism Transforms Bacon’s
Park
Upon his death in 1911, U.S. Senator Augustus Bacon donated
some land to the city of Macon, Georgia, to be used as a park for
white people only. The estate was left to the care of seven white
board members. In time, the city of Macon allowed blacks to use the
12
park, and the Board sued the city. The city responded by giving up
control of the park to a new set of private trustees, ensuring reversion
to a policy of segregation in the park. Members of the black
community intervened in the legal case, arguing that the city’s
decision to give up control of the park violated the Fourteenth
Amendment. Writing for the majority, Justice Douglas agreed:
[W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with
powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies
or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional
limitations . . . [T]he public character of this park requires that it be
treated as a public institution subject to the command of the
Fourteenth Amendment, regardless of who now has title under state
13
law.

Thus, the Supreme Court ruled that the city had no right to transfer
control of the park to a private authority that would then enforce
segregation.
Justice Black, dissenting, argued that the case did not have
anything to do with racial discrimination, but was rather about states’
powers to enforce wills and trusts:
I find nothing in the United States Constitution that compels any
city or other state subdivision to hold title to property it does not
want or to act as trustee under a will when it chooses not to do so.
The State Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope and effect of
this Georgia decree should be binding upon us unless the State

12. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 297 (1966).
13. Id. at 302.
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Supreme Court has somehow lost its power to control and limit the
scope and effect of Georgia trial court decrees relating to Georgia
wills creating Georgia trusts of Georgia property. A holding that
ignores this state power would be so destructive of our state judicial
systems that it could find no support, we think, in our Federal
14
Constitution or in any of this Court’s prior decisions.

Black further argued that the Court did not have the right to
hear the case, as this decision should have been entirely within the
15
providence of state powers and state courts. He labeled the ruling
16
“revolutionary” in its effect on state court power over such matters.
Justice Douglas’s majority opinion did not consider the
implications of the decision for the future of the state’s control over
its wills and trusts, but the dissenting opinion raised the issue
explicitly. Our argument is that in this case, intentionally or
unintentionally, Justice Black’s dissenting opinion signaled for other
potential litigants to explicitly frame future similar litigation in terms
of its implications for states’ powers, as a way of undermining the
existing majority coalition and potentially changing the outcome in
future litigation. Moreover, by bringing up the fact that the state
should not be compelled to act as the trustee of the will if it does not
17
wish to hold title to the property, Black may have inspired the
litigants in this specific case to sue for reinstatement of the property
to the heirs. Indeed, new case facts that were more amenable to a
decision favoring states’ rights actually did arise.
After the Supreme Court’s decision, the Georgia Supreme Court
suggested that it no longer had any right to maintain segregation and
simply invalidated the segregated portion of the will, maintaining its
18
right to oversee and regulate the park. In response, Senator Bacon’s
heirs sued for the reinstatement of the property to the Bacon estate.
The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that the segregated nature of the
19
park was an essential and inseparable part of Bacon’s will. Because
the state could no longer be entrusted with that authority, the
property ought to be reverted to Bacon’s heirs. The petitioners who
wanted to maintain the city’s right to continue its ownership and

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id. at 312 (Black, J., dissenting).
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Evans v. Newton, 148 S.E.2d 329, 330 (Ga. 1966).
Evans v. Abney, 165 S.E.2d 160, 163–64 (Ga. 1968).
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policy of desegregation of the park, along with the Attorney General
20
of Georgia, brought the case on appeal.
By the time the appeal reached the Supreme Court, Chief Justice
Burger had joined the Court; but this change in personnel only
provided one extra vote to the three-judge minority. A majority
nevertheless formed in support of the previously losing side when
Justice White became convinced by the implications of states’ powers
21
in the new case. The three-member dissent in Evans v. Newton
22
became a five-member majority in Evans v. Abney. Writing for the
new majority, Justice Black stated plainly, as he did in his previous
dissenting opinion, “We are of the opinion that in ruling as they did
the Georgia courts did no more than apply well-settled general
principles of Georgia law to determine the meaning and effect of a
23
Georgia will.”
Stated simply, an initial majority opinion was based on the
Fourteenth Amendment; only the dissent suggested that the debate
ought to be about state police powers to regulate wills and estates.
Although only one judge of the original 6–3 majority left the Court,
the initial dissenting opinion became the majority in the second case.
The actions that followed the Supreme Court’s decision—namely, the
heirs’ decision to sue for recovery of the land—resulted in new case
facts that allowed new litigation to be framed according to states’
powers rather than equal protection, as the dissent had suggested
with its signal. The new case was no longer about racial segregation in
a public park because there was no longer a public park; it was
privately owned land. Rather than seeing the park desegregated
against Bacon’s wishes, the trustees of Bacon’s will got what they
wanted—control over the land. Moreover, the dissenting Supreme
Court Justices in Evans v. Newton also got what they wanted—a case
framed in such a way to persuade colleagues from the previous
majority to join them and form a new majority.
In this example, the subsequent case concerns the same dispute
and litigants as the initial case, with newly manipulated case facts that
enable litigants to make legal arguments that are amenable to a
decision based on state powers. The dissenting minority was
successful in inspiring the litigants to reframe the case facts and
20.
21.
22.
23.

Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435, 437 (1970).
Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 (1970).
Id. at 440.
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therefore the legal issue, garnering a new majority. As the next
section shows, however, this reframing power is not limited to
relitigation of a particularized dispute.
B. Beyond Relitigation: Developing Doctrine in Subsequent
Litigation
We argue that dissents in a particular policy area can have an
impact on cases that are entirely separate from the original case. A
dissenting opinion regarding race discrimination could impact the way
lawyers decide to frame a case regarding gender discrimination. A
dissenting opinion in a case about obscenity and federal-state powers
could impact the framing of a free exercise case. A dissenting opinion
regarding the right to counsel could inspire the framing of a prisoner’s
rights case. Thus, though the dissent may have to do with one specific
set of case facts, it could have an impact on how litigants choose to
frame many different cases within the same policy area.
We found numerous examples in which the majority in an initial
case ignored federalism issues and a Justice dissented on the ground
of federal-state relations, whereas the majority in a later case referred
approvingly to the initial dissent and accepted that dissent’s position.
We provide a brief outline of three such pairs of cases to illustrate our
theory. These illustrations, however, are only suggestive of a
relationship between the two cases. Our empirical analysis in Part III
explores whether these effects are idiosyncratic or systematic.
One example can be found in a technical res judicata case,
24
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, which concerned an
25
allegation of price fixing in women’s clothing. In Moitie, the majority
dismissed an antitrust appeal that had been removed from state to
federal court on the basis of res judicata, refusing to find an equitable
26
exception on the basis of “public policy and simple Justice.” Justice
Brennan dissented, expressing the view that under settled principles
of federal jurisdiction, the claims refiled in state court should not have
27
been removed to federal court in the first place. Only his dissent
focused on state-federal issues. In 1987, the majority opinion in

24. Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 (1981).
25. Id. at 394.
26. Id. at 398 (“A final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.”).
27. Id. at 406 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“An action arising under state law may not be
removed solely because a federal right or immunity is raised as a defense.”).
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Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams found that breach of employment
contract claims were improperly removed from state courts to federal
29
courts. Explicitly citing the Moitie dissent, the opinion laid out strict
requirements under which cases can be properly removed from state
30
courts and forced into federal courts.
Both the case facts and the cases’ timing support our theory. The
first case occurred six years before the follow-up case. In Part III,
infra, we establish that it takes approximately four to six years for
new cases to reach the Supreme Court, and thus we expect the effect
of these dissenting signals to appear in cases four to six years after an
initial dissent mentioning federal-state issues.
31
A second example concerns preemption. In Motor Coach
32
Employees v. Lockridge, a challenge to a union’s firing of an
employee for not paying his dues failed because of preemption, as the
33
National Labor Relations Board had exclusive jurisdiction. The
majority stated that “nothing could serve more fully to defeat the
congressional goals underlying the Act than to subject, without
limitation, the relationships it seeks to create to the concurrent
jurisdiction of state and federal courts free to apply the general local
34
law.” Justice White dissented on the ground that the question was
35
not simply one of state and federal court jurisdiction. Rather, state
laws should apply when federal legislation arguably does not apply,
and so state courts should not be foreclosed from granting relief to
36
union members under those state laws. Justice White stated:

28. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 397 (“Caterpillar does not seek to point out that the contract relied upon by
respondents is in fact a collective agreement; rather it attempts to justify removal on the basis of
facts not alleged in the complaint. The ‘artful pleading’ doctrine cannot be invoked in such
circumstances.” (citing Moitie, 452 U.S. at 410 (Brennan, J., dissenting))).
31. Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274, 276 (1971) (“[The] National Labor Relations Act pre-empts state and federal court
jurisdiction to remedy conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act.”).
32. Amalgamated Ass’n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S.
274 (1971).
33. Id. at 302; see also id. at 276.
34. Id. at 287.
35. Id. at 309 (White, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 309 (“I could not join the opinion of the Court since it unqualifiedly applies the
same doctrine where the conduct of the union is only arguably protected under the federal
law.”).
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By making the matter one of state law, Congress has not only
authorized multiformity on the subject, but practically guaranteed
it. . . . [Section] 14 (b) of NLRA . . . has authorized States to choose
for themselves whether to require or permit union shops. This
allows the States to regulate union or agency shop clauses, so that
union insistence on a security agreement as part of a collective
bargaining agreement may be prohibited in one State and protected
37
or even encouraged in another.

Subsequently, in Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International
38
Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., a Court majority endorsed Justice White’s
approach by upholding a collective bargaining agreement involving a
39
union. The Court specified that although the National Labor
Relations Act
articulates a national policy that certain union-security agreements
are valid as a matter of federal law, § 14 (b) reflects Congress’
decision that any State or Territory that wishes to may exempt itself
from that policy. . . .We have recognized that with respect to those
state laws which § 14 (b) permits to be exempted from § 8 (a)(3)’s
national policy “[t]here is . . . conflict between state and federal law;
but it is a conflict sanctioned by Congress with directions to give the
40
right of way to state laws . . . .”

The first case was five years prior to the follow-up case.
A final illustration in which a dissent had an impact on future
litigation—both within the same issue area, as well as in adjacent
41
issue areas—is A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, in which
Justice Harlan dissented from a majority opinion that disallowed state
42
regulations of certain allegedly obscene materials. The majority
rejected the state’s treatment of the obscene materials as contraband
43
that could automatically be seized and destroyed, like illegal liquor.
The majority reasoned that written materials receive greater
protection than other illicit goods by virtue of the First Amendment,
37. Id. at 317–18 (citations omitted).
38. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407 (1976).
39. Id. at 416–17.
40. Id. (quoting Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)). Note, however,
that in this case, Texas’s statute did not satisfy § 14(b) “because most of the employees’ work is
done on the high seas, outside the territorial bounds of the State of Texas, [and so] Texas’ rightto-work laws cannot govern the validity of the agency-shop provision at issue here.” Id. at 420.
41. A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964).
42. Id. at 215 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 211 (majority opinion).
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and so procedures controlling written material must be “searching” to
44
avoid suppression of protected speech. Justice Harlan said that the
majority opinion “serves unnecessarily to handicap the States in their
45
efforts to curb the dissemination of obscene material.” That year,
46
Justice Harlan also dissented in Jacobellis v. Ohio, saying that the
states were afforded more latitude to ban “any material which, taken
as a whole, has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to
treat with sex in a fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally
47
established criteria for judging such material.”
The subsequent explosion in obscenity litigation eventually
48
resulted in Miller v. California, which put the regulation of obscene
49
materials mostly into the hands of the state. The same year, in Paris
50
Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, the majority approvingly cited multiple
51
dissents by Justice Harlan and adopted his overall approach of
52
giving the states great latitude in these matters. The Court’s
exposition on the law began: “It should be clear from the outset that
we do not undertake to tell the States what they must do, but rather
to define the area in which they may chart their own course in dealing
53
with obscene material.” The majority emphasized that there are
numerous legitimate state interests at stake in “stemming the tide of
54
commercialized obscenity,” and that the Court must give deference
44. Id. at 212 (“[The] use of these warrants implicates questions whether the procedures
leading to their issuance and surrounding their execution were adequate to avoid suppression of
constitutionally protected publications.”).
45. Id. at 215 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
46. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
47. Id. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
48. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
49. Id. at 19 (“[T]he States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or
exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to juveniles.”).
50. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
51. See, e.g., id. at 60.
52. Id. at 80 (“Mr. Justice Harlan, on the other hand, believed that the Federal
Government in the exercise of its enumerated powers could control the distribution of ‘hard
core’ pornography, while the States were afforded more latitude to ‘[ban] any material which,
taken as a whole, has been reasonably found in state judicial proceedings to treat with sex in a
fundamentally offensive manner, under rationally established criteria for judging such
material.’” (quoting Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 204 (Harlan, J., dissenting)) (citing Ginzburg v.
United States, 383 U.S. 463, 493 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); A Quantity of Copies of Books
v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 215 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
496 (1957) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
53. Id. at 54.
54. Id. at 57.
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to a state’s determination that obscenity is harmful to the public.
The Court’s attempts to articulate a national standard to the
regulation of obscenity had proved unworkable, and Justice Harlan’s
approach to treating the issue as one of respecting state-federal
division provided the Court with a means of avoiding many of these
56
intractable disputes.
Jacobellis and A Quantity of Copies of Books may have resulted
in additional cases regarding issue areas outside of obscenity. In the
years following these decisions, the Court heard a variety of First
Amendment cases that invoked the question of the balance of power
between the federal government and the states. One example is Gertz
57
v. Robert Welch, Inc., in which the Court found that “the States
should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal
remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a
58
private individual.” This finding is consistent with Justice Harlan’s
dissenting opinions in the obscenity cases.
These illustrations suggest that dissents based on federal-state
issues can effectively serve as signals for future litigation, and that this
may provide the dissenting Justices with cases that allow them to form
alternate majorities in subsequent cases. This raises three questions:
First, why would this strategy be successful? Second, are these
illustrations aberrations, or is there a significant and consistent
pattern in this phenomenon? Third, if there is a pattern, does it work
for both liberal and conservative initial dissents? The following Part
provides a theory of judicial signaling to answer the first question, and
then our empirical analysis addresses the second and third questions.
II. A THEORY OF JUDICIAL SIGNALING
Bacon’s case is an example of relitigation by the same plaintiffs
to achieve a different outcome, but as our other historical illustrations
suggest, signaling can have value beyond relitigation. Potential
litigants can look to signals coming out of a wide variety of cases in
55. Id. at 60–61 (“Although there is no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial
behavior and obscene material, the legislature of Georgia could quite reasonably determine that
such a connection does or might exist.”).
56. Id. at 64 (“The States, of course, may follow such a ‘laissez-faire’ policy and drop all
controls on commercialized obscenity, if that is what they prefer, just as they can ignore
consumer protection in the marketplace, but nothing in the Constitution compels the States to
do so with regard to matters falling within state jurisdiction.”).
57. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
58. Id. at 345–46.
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the same policy area, and decide which arguments to emphasize.
Bacon’s case illustrates that even in relation to the same controversy,
litigants can sometimes generate new case facts when they interpret
the dissent as a signal to frame future litigation according to federal
versus state powers. More typically, we expect subsequent cases to
occur a number of years after the initial case because the alternative
approach to the issue area will generally require new case facts. This
Part first spells out the assumptions our theory is based on, and then
provides more detail on the theory itself.
A. Assumptions
Our theory hinges on the truth of six assumptions about judicial
behavior. The first group of three assumptions about the policy
preferences of Justices is now fairly uncontroversial, as they have
been well established in empirical legal and political science
literatures. We briefly outline the literature substantiating each of
these assumptions. The second group of three assumptions is more
controversial, and we address their plausibility and impact.
1. Justices’ Policy Preferences and Strategic Behavior. First, the
notion of signaling implicitly presumes that Justices have priorities
and preferences about case dispositions, and act in ways that are
consistent with those preferences. Whereas at one time this position
may have been controversial, these days it is fairly well established.
For example, an extensive empirical literature exists that shows that
Justices vote strategically over certiorari, to ensure both that the
Court hears the sort of cases the Justices are interested in and that it
does not hear cases that will set a precedent contrary to each Justice’s
59
preferences.
In a comprehensive study using judicial records and some of the
Justices’ private papers, Professors Epstein and Knight examined
judicial notes and letters that reveal Justices engaging in negotiation
60
and bargaining with one another. Epstein and Knight also compared
early and late drafts of opinions, and compared Justices’ initial
59. See, e.g., Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J. POL. 824,
825–26 (1995); Gregory A. Caldeira, John R. Wright & Christopher J.W. Zorn, Sophisticated
Voting and Gate-Keeping in the Supreme Court, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 549 passim (1999); Kevin
T. McGuire & Gregory A. Caldeira, Lawyers, Organized Interests, and the Law of Obscenity:
Agenda Setting in the Supreme Court, 87 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 717, 717–18 (1993).
60. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 73–76.
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conference votes to their final case positions. They uncovered
evidence of three types of strategic activities. First, Justices undertake
bargaining with one another—over certiorari, policy at the merit
62
stage, and opinion writing. Second, Justices engage in “forward
thinking,” which includes: considering the expected behavior of
external actors; defensive denials, or refusing to take a case the
Justice may wish to hear out of an expectation the Justice will be
unable to garner majority support; and aggressive grants, or taking a
case that may not warrant review because the Justice calculates that it
63
may be good for developing a doctrine. Forward thinking also
64
includes manipulating the agenda, particularly at conference. Third,
Justices write sophisticated opinions, which attempt to win over
65
ambivalent colleagues. Epstein and Knight’s work provides ample
evidence that Justices have preferences about case outcomes, and that
overall they act consistently with those preferences.
Second, for signaling to be an effective strategy, Justices must
have enough information about their colleagues’ preferences to
enable them to know what kinds of arguments would be likely to
66
persuade their colleagues to join them. Justices have the benefit of
conference discussion and less formal interactions with their
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Id. at 90–98, 99–105 tbl.3-6.
Id. at 58–79.
Id. at 79–88.
Id. at 88–95.
Id. at 95–111. See generally FORREST MALTZMAN, JAMES F. SPRIGGS II & PAUL J.
WAHLBECK, CRAFTING LAW ON THE SUPREME COURT: THE COLLEGIAL GAME (2000)
(highlighting the extent to which strategic interactions among the Justices shape the Court’s
opinions). But see Boucher & Segal, supra note 59, at 829 (finding evidence for aggressive grants
but not for defensive denials, and theorizing and finding that a decision to grant certiorari is a
function of a desire to reverse, the support the Justice expects from the rest of the Court, and an
interaction between these two variables). Professors Boucher and Segal find that the extent of
strategic behavior varies by individual Justice. Id.; see also PERRY, supra note 2, at 276 (“It was
clear that strategic considerations tended to be the exception rather than the rule for all of the
justices, though some justices were clearly strategic more often than others.”).
66. This is a fairly standard assumption that scholars studying the courts make. See, e.g.,
Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Jennifer Nicoll Victor, Dynamic Agenda-Setting on the United
States Supreme Court: An Empirical Assessment, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 420 (2002). Some
scholars, however, assume the opposite. E.g., Lawrence Baum, Policy Goals in Judicial
Gatekeeping: A Proximity Model of Discretionary Jurisdiction, 21 AM. J. POL. SCI. 13, 17 (1977).
One of the few studies to challenge this notion is John F. Krol & Saul Brenner, Strategies in
Certiorari Voting on the United States Supreme Court: A Reevaluation, 43 W. POL. Q. 335, 338
(1990), but arguably their results actually support the hypothesis that judges consider their
colleagues’ likely actions. Of the three hypotheses relating to this topic that they test, the
evidence supports two, and the one the evidence does not support relates to predicting the
behavior of uncertain judges only.
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colleagues to develop private knowledge of their proclivities.
Although this evidence is necessarily indirect, a number of studies
have provided evidence that the Justices have foreknowledge of their
67
colleagues’ future outcomes. For instance, studies have found that
judicial decisions depend on the level of support judges expect from
68
69
other members of the court, implying some level of foreknowledge.
These findings show both that judges can accurately anticipate their
colleagues’ likely actions and that judges’ own actions vary with the
likelihood that they will cast the pivotal vote.
Third, the theory of judicial signaling to litigants must implicitly
assume that litigants want to win and will use whatever arguments
they believe will help them win, and that their lawyers use
information from Justices’ written opinions to gauge which case facts
and legal arguments will appeal to which Justices. This assumption is
70
also established in the political science literature. For instance,
scholars have shown that both organized interests and professional
bars shape judicial agendas by drawing Justices’ attention to cases
71
with a potentially large impact on public policy.
2. Litigants, Their Access to Cases, and the Timing of Litigation.
Thus, these three core assumptions about strategic judicial behavior
are well established. There are other aspects of our theory of judicial
signaling, however, that may be more controversial. First, for the
process to work systematically, there must be a sufficient number of
sophisticated litigants who pay attention to signals so that opinions in
cases with one issue can successfully summon cases in other issue
areas within the same broad policy area. Second, litigants must have
access to a wide variety of cases with a wide variety of case facts,
some of which lend themselves to appropriate legal arguments that
are likely to appeal to the Justices. Third, because, as we show in
Section B, this effect takes several years, Justices must be willing to
wait to hear cases that are not already in the litigation pipeline—

67. See Caldeira et al., supra note 59; Epstein et al., supra note 66.
68. See, e.g., Boucher & Segal, supra note 59, at 832.
69. Saul Brenner, The New Certiorari Game, 41 J. POL. 649, 651 (1979) (“Justices can be
expected to calculate with a high degree of accuracy for they have the motivation, ability, and
opportunity to do so.”).
70. See, e.g., Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in
the Supreme Court, 24 L. & SOC’Y REV. 807, 828–29 (1990) (showing that the filing of amicus
briefs greatly increases the odds that the Court will grant certiorari).
71. See McGuire & Caldeira, supra note 59, at 724.
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because high-quality cases, framed in a way that Justices would like to
see them framed, are relatively rare and are therefore worth waiting
for.
To defend the two assumptions relating to strategic litigant
activity, we drew evidence from personal interviews with directors of
interest groups who support litigation. In 2001, the Colorado Legal
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) stated that
the Colorado branch receives ten thousand calls a year from people
72
who claim that their rights or liberties have been violated. Of those
ten thousand, two thousand are serious violations. If this is true of all
fifty state ACLUs, and given the number of other groups and law
firms that support litigation, then there is a great deal of access to a
73
high number of quality cases from which to choose. The ACLU
Board meets often to discuss which of those two thousand cases are
worthy of ACLU support. In an interview with Steven Shapiro, the
Legal Director of the National ACLU, Shapiro claimed that the
74
ACLU supports over a thousand cases at any one time. Thus, there
are probably a sufficient number of controversies so that these groups
or law firms serve as a form of litigation triage. Whereas triage in an
emergency room prioritizes the worst cases, litigation triage
prioritizes the cases that are most likely to lend themselves to legal
arguments that will balance the preference for legal change with a
preference for winning. As this process occurs, Justices receive high
quality cases that allow them to act in a way consistent with their own
priorities and preferences, given the preferences of their colleagues
(or at least four other colleagues).
The third of these more controversial assumptions has not been
proven in the political science literature. Although many authors have
recognized that judges act strategically, they have largely studied
short-term strategy: how judges ensure their favored outcome in any
given case. For most studies, an assumption of short-term judicial
75
76
focus is implicit; for others it is explicit. But there is no reason to

72. Interview with Simon Mole, Intake Dir., Colorado ACLU, in Denver, Colo. (May 6,
2001) (on file with author).
73. On the role of other interest group–based litigation, see VANESSA A. BAIRD,
ANSWERING THE CALL OF THE COURT: HOW JUSTICES AND LITIGANTS SET THE SUPREME
COURT AGENDA 46–48 (2007).
74. Interview with Steven Shapiro, Legal Dir., National ACLU, in N.Y., N.Y. (May 18,
2001) (on file with author).
75. Baum, supra note 66, at 16.
76. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 18.
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assume that judges have such a myopic focus, particularly those with
lifetime tenure. Judges may seek to have the capacity to set the law of
the land (or state or region), and thus may be willing to sacrifice their
preferred outcome in a given case to find a better vehicle to direct the
development of the law.
Just as the political science literature has shown that Justices are
strategic, we consider that they are likely to have a long-term as well
as a short-term focus. We also believe that litigants as a whole are
likely to act strategically, even if any given individual may be less
sophisticated. Ultimately, if we are wrong in these assumptions, then
we should not find the effect we hypothesize.
B. Formalizing a Theory of Judicial Signaling
In this Section, we clarify all aspects of our theory explicitly.
First, we describe the theory in detail. Then, we present empirical
evidence that helps bolster our expected time lags between the signals
and the resulting cases. Third, we explain how issue agendas are
transformed to a dimension dealing with federal and state powers.
1. Description of Signaling Theory. Our theory is akin to Riker’s
theory of “heresthetics,” a word Riker created from the Greek root
77
meaning “choosing or electing.” A heresthetical maneuver involves
an actor who sets the agenda by choosing a question strategically to
generate supportive majority coalitions for a particular outcome, even
when the majority may not seem supportive when the discussion is
framed on another dimension. The agenda setter manipulates the
substance of the proposal from one dimension to another,
78
transforming a minority coalition into a majority coalition.
Justices’ dissents often argue that the Court should have decided
a case according to a different legal rationale. Likeminded future
litigants can interpret legal rationales in dissenting opinions as
information about how they might reconstruct the case facts and legal
arguments to be more likely to win on the merits in the future. We
argue that these dissenting opinions could have an impact on a wide
variety of issues in the same policy area. For example, if a dissenting
opinion on the issue of libel says that the states should have a wider
ability to regulate these matters, the dissent will have an impact on
litigants who are considering other legal questions associated with the
77. WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE ART OF POLITICAL MANIPULATION, at ix (1986).
78. Id. at 1.
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First Amendment. Litigants have an incentive to use all available
information—and although dissenting signals may need to be assessed
with skepticism, they can be informative for litigants deciding how to
79
frame future cases.
It is not essential for us to ascertain whether a Justice intended to
signal for future cases. What is vital is that we can ascertain Justices’
preferences and then show that litigants use that information to
create outcomes that are in line with those preferences. Whether
Justices know or intend that this will happen is less important than
showing that dissenting Justices get what they want: a chance to be in
the majority when they were previously in the minority.
In this Article, we look at dissenting opinions in cases
representing a wide variety of policy areas. We look specifically at
dissenting opinions that mention that the Court should not have
decided the case the way it did because of rules about the state and
federal balance of power. The policy areas include First Amendment,
discrimination, privacy, criminal rights and procedure, labor and
labor union issues, the environment, economic regulation, taxation,
due process and government liability, judicial power, and federalism.
We consider only dissenting opinions that mention federalism when
the majority opinion does not mention federalism, which we refer to
as “federalism dissents.” This way, we can focus exclusively on the
effect of the dissenting opinion. We examine whether signals have a
systematic impact on the ideological placement of the Supreme
Court’s policy outputs in future cases that are framed in terms of
federalism. Can a conservative dissenting coalition become a majority
coalition in future cases in the same policy areas when the cases are
framed in terms of the balance of state and federal power? Do liberal
dissenting opinions have a similar impact?
Past research bolsters our claim that there is indeed a systematic
effect. Strategic litigants bring litigation with the Court’s policy
80
priorities in mind. Moreover, they bring litigation that is framed in a
way that will appeal to the marginal or swing Justice on a given
81
issue. Studies have shown that the lag time in new cases reaching the
79. See Tonja Jacobi, The Judicial Signaling Game: How Judges Shape Their Dockets, 16
SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 11–13 (2008) (discussing the signaling interaction between judges and
litigants).
80. See Vanessa A. Baird, The Effect of Politically Salient Decisions on the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Agenda, 66 J. POL. 755, 756 (2004).
81. See BAIRD, supra note 73, at 149 (“[T]he strategy is to figure out a way to appeal to the
tie-breaker, or the justices that are ideologically in the center.”).

BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC

10/6/2009 6:28:09 PM

2009] HOW THE DISSENT BECOMES THE MAJORITY

203

Supreme Court in response to the Court’s signals is approximately
82
five years.
This theory relies on two specific assertions. One is the issue of
litigation timing. Sending a signal to inspire litigants to bring issues
that are based on federal-state powers will require some number of
years. Here we rely on previous empirical research that looks at the
timing of the effect of signals on future litigation. Secondly, our
theory relies on the idea that when litigants present Justices with new
case facts in which the balance of federal-state powers is the dominant
issue, they can persuade Justices to vote a different way. The
following two sections provide evidence of these two effects.
2. The Litigation Time Lag. Why do we expect this level of time
lag? We can form a rough estimate of the time lag we should expect
by looking at statistics on the time interval between filing at the
district court level and disposition at the Supreme Court. According
to the Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics provided by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the median time
interval between filing and disposition of civil cases in U.S. district
83
courts for the period ending on September 30, 2004, is 21.1 months.
The median time interval between filing notice of appeal and
84
disposition in the U.S. courts of appeals is 10.5 months.
Unfortunately, the Administrative Office does not provide similar
figures for the additional interval between Supreme Court filing and
disposition, so we cannot be sure of the cumulative total for
disposition. But we would anticipate a somewhat similar time interval
between Supreme Court filing and disposition, suggesting an
approximate time frame of four years. We may, however, expect a
longer delay in cases generated in response to signals, as this requires
a case-generating controversy. This delay may be even longer for
cases generated in response to federalism signals, as the relevant
initiating action is some governmental action, such as the passage of
legislation. Thus, we expect that dissenting signals will generate new
cases with new case facts in the given policy area sometime in the
following four to six years.

82. Id. at 69.
83. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS 162 tbl.C-5 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/c5.pdf.
84. Id. at 97 tbl.B-4, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b4.pdf.
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Our first step, then, is to ascertain whether there are cycles of
Supreme Court attention to certain issues. This determination will not
establish a signaling effect, but it will be an important initial element
of our analysis. We did this first by examining one particular policy
area over time, in Figure 1, and then we generalized this examination
to all policy areas, in Table 1.
Figure 1. Attention to Criminals’ Rights Cases at the Supreme
Court, 1953–2000
80
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A look at the historical trend of the Supreme Court’s attention to
criminal cases serves to illustrate the signaling effect in the timing of
litigation. Figure 1 presents the number of cases that the Supreme
Court heard dealing with criminals’ rights cases from 1953 through
2000. The x-axis is the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the number of
cases the Court hears. The years in which there are a significantly
higher number of cases than previous years are shaded. These years
are 1957, 1963, 1967, 1971, 1972, 1976, 1979, 1983, 1989, 1992, and
1997.
The interesting aspect of this figure is that in no year except one,
during which there was a high yield, does the caseload remain as high
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in the subsequent year. Except for the years 1971 and 1972, when
there are a high number of cases, the caseload drops in the following
two to five years. It then reaches another spike. This informal look at
the data gives the impression that there are increases in the attention
to criminal cases every three to six years. A time-series analysis that
looks at the effect of important cases on the number of future cases
85
reveals that on average, in criminal cases, the cycle is four years.
Figure 1 does not prove the signaling effects that we theorize, but
it does indicate that the kind of trend we expect to arise if signaling
occurs does exist—at least in relation to criminal rights. Table 1 shows
that this effect is not confined to criminal rights cases; it reports a
similar effect in the average time lag for all other Supreme Court
policy areas. In every policy area on the Court’s agenda, the attention
cycle ranges from three to six years.
Table 1. Average Time Lag of the Effect of Important Decisions
on Future Supreme Court Agenda Attention
Policy Area

Average Cycle of Supreme
Court Agenda Attention

Discrimination

3 to 6 years

First Amendment

3 to 4 years

Privacy

3 years

Criminal Rights

4 years

Labor

3 years

Environment

3 to 5 years

Economic Regulation

4 years

Taxation

6 years

Due Process and Government Liability

5 years

Judicial Power

5 years

Note: These policy area categories match Spaeth’s coding of “Value” from the United
States Supreme Court Judicial Database fairly closely, with a few exceptions: the separation of
environmental cases into their own category, the inclusion of personal injury and government

85. See Baird, supra note 80, at 764. The time-series analysis reported here looks at the
effect of an index measuring “important” decisions on the future caseload of cases in that policy
area. We used a simple Prais-Winsten regression. Important cases are measured by counting the
number of cases that are reported on the front page of the New York Times, see Lee Epstein &
Jeffrey A. Segal, Measuring Issue Salience, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 66, 72 (2000); declarations of
unconstitutionality; cases that formally reverse precedent; and the proportion of cases that
reverse lower court decisions. Each indicator is standardized on a scale of 0 to 1 and is then
summed. This index is meant to indicate signals from the Court that at least some subset of
Justices considers this policy area a priority. This analysis appears in more detail in Baird, supra
note 80, at 759–62.
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liability with noncriminal due process cases, and the inclusion of state and federal taxation into
the same category. Furthermore, miscellaneous and attorney law issues are excluded from the
analysis.
Phase II of the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database codes every opinion for
whether the case’s topic involves the balance of power between the states and the federal
government. Moreover, every opinion is coded for whether it expands or restricts the powers of
the states or the federal government in relation to one another. The presence of federalism is
coded positively when the topic is the balance of power or when the value either expands or
restricts federal or state power.
All orally argued cases, whether they resulted in signed or unsigned opinions, including
per curium decisions and judgments, are counted. Memoranda, decrees, multiple docket
numbers, and any case that resulted in a split vote are excluded. Some case citations represent
multiple issues. When these issues span across different policy areas, they are counted once for
each issue represented; otherwise, they are counted only once.

The implication of Table 1 is that when Justices indicate—by
deciding to focus their agenda on a particular area of jurisprudence—
that they consider a particular area a priority, the Court does not
immediately pursue additional cases in that area in subsequent years.
After the Court’s initial flurry of activity in a certain policy area,
there is a lag of three to six years before the Court puts additional
cases in that policy area on the agenda. It seems that if Justices
consider a certain policy area a priority in one year, they would
consider it a priority in the following year. So why wait?
The answer we find most appealing is that they are waiting for
86
the most appropriate case vehicles. When litigants—or interest
groups or other political actors interested in legal change—perceive
that a particular policy is a priority, they begin to scour the universe
for appropriate cases. As with our ACLU example, litigants are most
likely to pick cases that respond specifically to legal arguments in
previous cases. The cases then take three to five years in the litigation
pipeline before the Supreme Court hears them. Seemingly, the Court
depends on litigants to respond to what the Justices are saying in their
cases, and this process tends to take three to six years.
But why do Justices need to signal for cases in the future? If the
Justices did not need new case facts, they could simply transform the
issue in the initial case into one involving federalism, without needing
new litigation. There are instances when Justices can manipulate the
issues without waiting for litigants to frame new cases appropriately.
Professors Epstein and Shvetsova note examples of this, showing that
the Chief Justice can have some impact on which issues are taken into
87
88
consideration on the merits. Moreover, Professors Ulmer and
86. On the weight that Justices give to finding an appropriate vehicle to develop an area of
the law, see PERRY, supra note 2, at 234.
87. See Lee Epstein & Olga Shvetsova, Heresthetical Maneuvering on the US Supreme
Court, 14 J. THEORETICAL POL. 93, 104–13 (2002).
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89

McGuire and Palmer provide evidence that Justices, because they
prefer some issues over others, create issues that were not presented
before them—a phenomenon called “issue fluidity,” whereby Justices
address legal questions in their opinions that were not presented in
90
the legal briefs.
The response to this counterargument is that Justices may not
always be as willing or able to address issues that the litigants did not
present. Professors Epstein, Segal, and Johnson argue that some
Justices consider issue fluidity inappropriate; it violates a norm they
91
consider important. By the time a case reaches the Supreme Court, it
has a well-developed record that is often difficult to ignore. In fact,
even before a sympathetic judge, an outcome may depend not simply
on the fact that a litigant makes a federalism argument, but may
require a particular form of that argument. Because litigants need to
choose carefully the arguments they make before the Court—due to
opportunity costs created by time constraints and judicial impatience
with litigants who throw every possible argument into a brief—
effective signaling will often require new litigation, and will not be
amenable to fact or issue manipulation.
Holding all else equal, Justices are likely to prefer cases with
facts amenable to particular legal arguments, rather than cases in
which they have to create the issue themselves. And if the initial case
facts do not lend themselves to being framed on the basis of federalstate power, the Justices will require new case facts to generate
different legal arguments. In this situation, litigants have an incentive
to find (or create) new case facts and bring new litigation that allows
dissenting Justices to persuade their previously unsympathetic
colleagues to join them in their opinion.
Signaling provides a means of finding appropriate legal vehicles
with appropriate case facts and appropriate parties in the policy areas
that Justices want to influence, thus allowing them to maximize their

88. See S. Sidney Ulmer, Issue Fluidity in the U.S. Supreme Court: A Conceptual Analysis,
in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 319, 322 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M.
Lamb eds., 1982).
89. See Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 89
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691, 691 (1995).
90. See id.; Ulmer, supra note 88, at 322.
91. See Lee Epstein, Jeffrey A. Segal & Timothy Johnson, The Claim of Issue Creation on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 845, 845 (1996) (“[T]he sua sponte doctrine,
namely, the practice disfavoring the creation of issues not raised in the record before the Court,
is a norm.”).
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policymaking power while minimizing their need to violate judicial
norms. Litigants facing analogous but unrelated circumstances can
benefit from judicial signals of how best to argue their case. The
implication of our theory is that Justices benefit from litigants’
interpretation of their written opinions. Litigants aid Justices by
interpreting their signals and bringing them cases that better enable
them to persuade their colleagues to vote with them.
3. Transforming the Issue Dimension of Judicial Decisionmaking.
If litigants are responsive to judicial signals, what can dissenting
Justices signal as a means of upsetting the existing majority on an
issue? Our illustrations suggest that federal-state issues often cut
across the various substantive legal issues, providing an alternative
route to deciding the case. Consistent with this, Table 2, infra, shows
that federalism arguments appear in majority opinions across all
policy areas. Questions of federal-state power are not raised in every
case, but they do cross every broad policy area the Supreme Court
addresses and arise in a significant number of cases.
Figure 2 shows the overall preference positions of the Roberts
92
Court using Martin-Quinn measures of judicial positioning in the
2008 Term along a unidimensional liberal-conservative scale. The
process by which the Martin-Quinn scores are calculated is discussed
infra in Part III. For the moment, it is enough to know that one way
of summarizing judicial preferences is along a single ideological
dimension.
Figure 2. Judicial Preferences on the Roberts Court, 2008 Term

Empirical judicial scholars have not yet proven whether the
overwhelming bulk of decisionmaking for courts can be collapsed
down to one dimension of liberalism versus conservatism without
93
94
losing much explanatory power —as it can be for Congress. This is
92. See Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).
93. See, e.g., Bernard Grofman & Timothy J. Brazill, Identifying the Median
Justice on the Supreme Court Through Multidimensional Scaling: Analysis of “Natural
Courts” 1953-1991, 112 P UB . C HOICE 55, 58 (2002) (noting that a single dimension
explains much of the Justices’ voting behaviors). Some law scholars, however, take
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an empirical question of great significance for the study of judicial
behavior, but we need not decide it for our purposes. Even if much of
judicial decisionmaking can be described in terms of one liberalconservative dimension, this does not mean that there cannot be
cross-cutting issues in some cases. We do not dispute the possibility
that much of judicial decisionmaking can be described
unidimensionally. Indeed, our theory reinforces the idea that at
times, Justices behave strategically by using other dimensions to
persuade their colleagues to vote a different way so that they can
achieve outcomes consistent with their pure policy objectives. Put
another way, even if the liberal-conservative dimension is dominant,
other factors can effectively divide majorities on some issues.
Interpretive methodology or procedural issues could be factors;
arguably, federalism is another. For example, Professors Spiller and
Tiller model federalism as a second decisionmaking dimension, and
95
find preliminary support for that view. It is this variation that we
explain here.
If only one dimension shapes all judicial decisions, then all case
outcomes should look the same, regardless of the position of the
underlying case facts or policy outcome if the Court does not reverse.
The outcome will always be at the median Justice’s ideal point. We
know that median Justices are typically the most important Justices
on the Court, but Professors Epstein and Jacobi showed that some
median Justices are much more powerful than others, and that

issue with this idea. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Sincere and Strategic Voting Norms
on Multimember Courts, 97 M ICH . L. R EV . 2297, 2320 (1999) (“It is frequently
assumed that . . . the majority will converge in a moderate or median position. This
may well be quite likely when the Justices’ ideal points can be lined up nicely in a singlepeaked fashion along a single dimension, for instance from liberal to
conservative. . . . But sometimes the options under discussion cannot easily be
aligned along a single dimension.”).
94. See K EITH T. P OOLE & H OWARD R OSENTHAL , C ONGRESS : A P OLITICAL –
E CONOMIC H ISTORY OF R OLL C ALL V OTING 229 (1997) (“The most recent
Congresses are highly unidimensional, very polarized, and fit the spatial model
extremely well.”); Keith T. Poole, Changing Minds? Not in Congress!, 131 P UB .
C HOICE 435, 437 (2007) (reporting that voting in Congress is almost exclusively onedimensional, such that now “a single dimension accounts for about 92 percent of roll call
voting”).
95. See generally Pablo T. Spiller & Emerson H. Tiller, Invitations to Override:
Congressional Reversals of Supreme Court Decisions, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 503 (1996)
(modeling decisionmaking as a product of a substantive legal issue and federalism, and
providing initial empirical evidence of some cases dividing Justices by these two dimensions).
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weaker medians do not get their way in many cases, including many
96
important ones.
Considering a second dimension presents the possibility of
multiple alternative strategies. This provides an explanation of why
97
dissenting opinions raise different issues. Judges on the losing side of
an issue may seek to undermine the existing majority. Having lost on
the substance of an issue, judges can look to an alternative basis—
federalism—to decide the case, potentially destabilizing the winning
coalition. Figure 3 illustrates why.
Figure 3 illustrates two possible positions of the three central
Justices on the current Court. Justices Breyer, Kennedy, and Roberts
are arrayed as in Figure 2, but with two different hypothesized
positions on a federalism dimension (no equivalent score exists for
judicial preferences in relation to federalism in particular). If judicial
preferences vary by topic, as in Figure 3A, it is easy to see why
different combinations of judges can form majorities, including
majorities that exclude the median. If a case were decided on the
substantive criminal rights issue in Figure 3A, Justice Kennedy could
form a majority with Justice Roberts or Justice Breyer or both, but it
would be unlikely that any majority would form without him. But if
the case were decided on the basis of federalism, Justices Breyer and
Roberts would be more likely to agree with each other than either
Justice would with Justice Kennedy—and thus a different majority
could form, potentially deciding the case in the opposite direction.
Figure 3. Possible Judicial Positioning in Two Dimensions
Figure 3A. Variation by Topic
Federalism

Figure 3B. Perfect Correlation
Federalism

Criminal Rights

Criminal Rights

96. Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 73–89 (2008).
97. Scholars have struggled to provide a systematic theory of why judges publish dissents.
See, e.g., EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 60–62.
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If instead there is little difference between judicial views on the
substantive issue of criminal rights and federalism, as illustrated in
Figure 3B, different majorities could form as long as the underlying
case facts facing the Justices do not always arise on the exact dividing
98
line illustrated in Figure 3B. With two potential dimensions, every
possible combination of judges can form a majority, and a majority
99
always exists that can overturn any other majority. Thus, not only
could Justices Breyer and Roberts agree on an outcome that Justice
Kennedy disagreed with—as their purported federalism positions in
Figure 3 indicate—but even Justices whose positions are extremely
divided on most substantive issues, such as Justices Stevens and
Scalia, could potentially agree on an outcome. For instance, in Raich,
as we discussed, Justices Stevens and Scalia both decided in favor of
the federal government—Justice Stevens’s subsequent statements
suggest that he based his decision on federalism, whereas Justice
Scalia’s vote is easier to reconcile with his views on the substantive
issue, rather than with his position in previous cases regarding
100
federalism. Consequently, some decisions made on the initial policy
dimension can be overturned through the introduction of the second
dimension.
Thus, if a judge intends to dissent in a case, it may be beneficial
to introduce a federalism argument that constitutes an alternative
means of addressing the question. If litigants respond by bringing new
cases based on that federalism argument, which then work their way
through the judicial system in the next few years, a majority may exist
to overturn the initial outcome. This does not require any personnel

98. Thus, even if federalism is purely a methodological means of reaching an outcome that
each judge would prefer on the first dimension, different majorities nonetheless may form when
only one dimension is at play. In fact, our empirical results show that federalism is not just a
proxy for conservative ideology, but also results in liberal movements in outcomes. See infra
Part III.
99. See KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 46–60 (2d ed.
1963); Richard D. McKelvey, Intransitivities in Multidimensional Voting Models and Some
Implications for Agenda Control, 12 J. ECON. THEORY 472, 472 (1976); Norman Schofield,
Transitivity of Preferences on a Smooth Manifold of Alternatives, 14 J. ECON. THEORY 149, 149
(1977).
100. Justice Scalia joined the majority in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), both of which favored restrictions on the federal
government and protection for traditional state activities. Justice Scalia’s overall ideological
score, however, was a very conservative 2.736 in the 2008 Term, Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M.
Quinn, Martin-Quinn Scores, http://mqscores.wustl.edu/measures.php (last visited Oct. 3, 2009),
which is compatible with the strong law and order substantive outcome that Raich enabled.
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changes or ideological convergence of the Justices. It simply requires
that the second dimension be salient to judicial decisionmaking.
Our aim is not to identify the exact location of case outcomes in
two-dimensional space, but rather to show the extent to which
manipulation of the second dimension can change the outcome of a
case in the first dimension. As long as judicial decisionmaking is
affected by more than simply the left-right ideological policy
continuum, this model explains why a dissent that relies on
federalism, and signals the possibility of an alternative outcome on
federalism grounds, can result in a majority favoring the original
dissenter’s position. We now formalize the hypotheses of this theory
and test them.
III. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL SIGNALING
In this Part, we statistically test the impact of dissenting signals
on the ideological placement of subsequent Supreme Court cases
across various policy areas from 1953 through 1985. Although our
choice of case studies may be somewhat persuasive, we think that a
large-scale empirical approach is essential to assessing whether the
effect that these cases preliminarily identify is common or
exceptional. The signals with which we are concerned are necessarily
coded in the rarefied language of judicial propriety. Thus, this is a
subtle phenomenon that can only be seen clearly in rare cases. Our
case studies may be remarkable because the effects seem quite clear.
Fortunately, we have empirical tools to conduct a broader analysis
that allows us to ascertain whether our case studies are representative
of a more systematic effect.
There are three hypotheses in this analysis. Hypothesis 1 is that
any dissenting opinion that raises the issue of federalism leads to an
increase in the number of cases that are decided primarily on the
basis of federalism. Hypothesis 2 is that conservative dissenting
opinions that mention federalism lead to future majority opinions
that are decided on the basis of federalism and move the Court’s
ideological placement in a conservative direction. Hypothesis 3
mirrors the ideological component of the second hypothesis: it
proposes that liberal dissenting opinions that mention federalism lead
to future majority opinions that are decided on the basis of federalism
and move the Court’s ideological placement in a liberal direction.
Before undertaking our analysis, we describe our data and forms
of measurement—the empirical tools we use in this enterprise. We
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then describe how we measure changes in overall case outcomes
within a given area of the law, before providing our results.
A. Methods
1. Data. Our second and third hypotheses test the effect of
dissenting opinions only when the majority opinion does not mention
federalism as a relevant dimension. This way, the tests can focus
directly on the effect of the information contained in the dissenting
opinion. Our units of analysis—that is, where we look for an impact
of these federalism-based dissents—are each policy area for each
Supreme Court Term from 1953 through 1985.
The data used for this analysis are from Phase I and Phase II of
101
the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database. Phase I codes
all cases as belonging primarily in a particular issue. We use these
102
issue codings to generate categories of policy areas. Phase II
provides data on every majority and dissenting opinion for every case
from 1953 through 1985. These data code all majority, dissenting, and
concurring opinions for whether the opinions’ authors make
statements about whether federal or state powers are relevant to the
103
opinion.
Cases are coded for whether the opinion’s author mentions that
the case expands or restricts the relative balance of federal and state
powers. A case coded positively for addressing federalism is not
precluded from being categorized as representing other topics or
issues. Opinions within all policy areas can invoke the question of
104
federal versus state powers. Figure 4 presents an example of

101. Gibson, supra note 5; Harold J. Spaeth, United States Supreme Court Judicial
Database, 1953–1997 Terms (ICPSR Study No. 9422, 1999), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.
3886/ICPSR09422.
102. These policy area categories match Spaeth’s coding of “Value” from the United States
Supreme Court Judicial Database fairly closely, with a few exceptions: the separation of
environmental cases into their own category, the inclusion of personal injury and government
liability with noncriminal due process cases, and the inclusion of state and federal taxation into
the same category. Miscellaneous and attorney law issues are excluded from the analysis.
103. This category includes issues of whether the nation or the state has authority in the area
of police powers to promote the health, welfare, safety, and morals of the citizens; federal
preemption of state jurisdiction and state court jurisdiction; whether there should be national or
uniform rules of behavior; and whether states should be permitted to make their own rules. The
intercoder reliability for whether federalism is mentioned is 88 percent.
104. We include federalism as one of the policy areas in the analysis. This is somewhat
confusing because we are talking about the number of cases within the policy area of federalism
that explicitly mention the balance of powers between states and the federal government. It
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discrimination cases from 1953 through 1985, showing the total
number of cases along with the proportion of cases that are decided
on the basis of the balance of state and federal power. The x-axis is
the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the number of cases.
Figure 4. Attention to the Balance of Federal and State Power in
Discrimination Cases at the Supreme Court, 1953–1985
50
45
40
35
30
Cases with federal
versus state power
implications

25
20

Cases without
federal versus state
power implications

15
10
5
0
53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85

seems as though all federalism cases would be about this balance of power. But not all issues
within the policy area of federalism are explicitly about the balance of power between states and
the federal government. For example, issues of state versus federal ownership, taxation,
interstate disputes, and the resolution of private property disputes such as marital property
disputes, do not necessarily fall within the category of resolving the balance of power between
states and the federal government. Therefore, not all cases within the policy area of federalism
are coded positively as having invoked the issue of intergovernmental balance of power. Cases
about judicial power might not seem to involve federalism questions, but these cases are coded
positively for federalism when the case is about the balance of power between states and federal
courts. Technically, all cases that reach the Supreme Court implicitly deal with whether federal
jurisdiction applies because it is implied in whether the Supreme Court has the power to hear
the case at all. Nevertheless, only opinions in which the Justices explicitly assess whether the
case invokes questions about the balance of federal-state power are coded positively as raising
federalism as an issue.
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There is a lot of variation over time in the number and
proportion of cases that mention federalism as the primary issue that
determined the case outcome. We see small increases early on, in
1960, 1965, and 1969. Consistent with what we might expect, there is a
sharp increase in attention to the balance of power between the
federal government and the states from the Warren Court to the
Burger Court. During the Warren Court, there is an average of 2.3
discrimination cases decided on the basis of the balance of power
each Term, whereas during the Burger Court, there is an average of
3.5. Nevertheless, there is quite a large amount of variation, even
within these natural Courts. We intend to explain this variation in the
first part of the analysis. When dissenting Justices mention that the
Court should have decided a case on the basis of federal and state
power, we hypothesize that there is likely to be an increase in this
kind of case on the Supreme Court’s future agenda. We anticipate
that this variation will occur along the recurring three-to-six-year
cycle, as with other signals and their effect on the agenda.
The independent variables—those factors that we hypothesize
are the causative variables—are the number of liberal and
conservative dissenting opinions in each policy area, for each year,
that mention the case’s implications for the legal relationship
between the states and the federal government. To code the
ideological direction of the dissenting opinions (liberal or
conservative), we identify the ideological direction of the majority
105
decision and code the dissent in the opposite direction. Importantly,
a dissent is only coded positively when the majority opinion does not
mention this balance of power. Thus, signals only count as signals
when the dissent suggests federalism as a relevant issue but the
majority does not. Otherwise, it would be difficult to know whether
the signal came from the dissent or the majority opinion, or whether
the mention of federalism is a signal at all. Because this argument’s
purpose is to assess how the dissent signals issues to transform itself
into the majority, we focus on information that comes only from
dissenting opinions.

105. For a discussion of these categories, see Spaeth, supra note 101. Between the Warren
and Burger Courts, the average intercoder reliability of this variable is 99 percent. It is possible
that in a small number of cases, the dissenting opinion is not actually ideologically opposite to
the majority opinion. The introduction of such measurement error should not be correlated with
the tendency of the Court to be liberal or conservative, and will lead to inefficient rather than
biased estimates, thus resulting in more conservative estimates of findings in the analysis.
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Table 2. Number and Percentage of Supreme Court Cases
Mentioning the Balance of Federal and State Powers by Policy Area,
1953–1985
Policy Area

Discrimination
First Amendment
Privacy
Criminal Rights
Labor

Federalism in

Federalism in

Federalism in

Total Number

Majority

Liberal

Conservative

of All Cases

Opinion

Dissent Only

Dissent Only

159 (15.6%)

16 (1.6%)

25 (2.5%)

1424

25 (4.6%)

2 (0.4%)

20 (3.7%)

712

2 (3.5%)

0 (0.0%)

3 (5.3%)

105

79 (5.8%)

17 (1.3%)

12 (0.9%)

1873

25 (8.4%)

1 (0.3%)

2 (0.7%)

353

21 (21.6%)

0 (0.0%)

3 (3.1%)

126

104 (10.7%)

7 (0.7%)

12 (1.2%)

1239

Taxation
Due Process &
Government
Liability

64 (20.1%)

3 (0.9%)

5 (1.6%)

430

25 (9.8%)

3 (1.2%)

2 (0.8%)

365

Judicial Power

99 (9.6%)

9 (0.9%)

9 (0.9%)

1373

141 (50.4%)

10 (3.6%)

5 (1.8%)

438

Environment
Economic
Regulation

Federalism

Note: These policy area categories match Spaeth’s coding of “Value” from the United
States Supreme Court Judicial Database closely, with a few exceptions: the separation of
environmental cases into their own category, the inclusion of personal injury and government
liability with noncriminal due process cases, and the inclusion of state and federal taxation into the
same category. Furthermore, miscellaneous and attorney law issues are excluded from the
analysis.
Phase II of the United States Supreme Court Judicial Database codes every opinion for
whether the case’s topic involves the balance of power between the states and the federal
government. Moreover, every opinion is coded for whether it expands or restricts the powers of
the states or the federal government in relation to one another. The presence of federalism is
coded positively when the topic is the balance of power or when the value either expands or
restricts federal or state power.
All orally argued cases, whether they resulted in signed or unsigned opinions, including per
curium decisions and judgments, are counted. Memoranda, decrees, multiple docket numbers, and
any case that resulted in a split vote are excluded. Some case citations represent multiple issues.
When these issues span across different policy areas, they are counted once for each issue
represented; otherwise, they are counted only once.

Table 2 presents the number and percentage of cases from 1953
through 1985 that were decided at least partially on the basis of the
balance of power between the states and the federal government.
There is considerable variation across policy areas in conservative
and liberal cases decided on this basis—ranging from 3.5 percent of
cases in the privacy policy area to 50.4 percent in the substantive
federalism policy area—but the percentage of cases most commonly
ranges between 5 and 20 percent. There are not large differences
between the percentage of liberal and conservative cases that
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mention the balance of state and federal power, but the tendency
leans slightly toward liberal majority opinions. Dissents that mention
federalism when the majority opinion does not mention federalism
are relatively rare, constituting about 1 percent of all cases. There
also does not seem to be a great difference between the number of
liberal and conservative dissents, though conservative dissents are
slightly more common in the areas of First Amendment,
discrimination, privacy, and the environment.
We hypothesize that liberal dissents should cause a move in the
liberal direction of those cases that are decided according to
federalism; conservative dissents should cause a move in a
conservative direction. To test these hypotheses, we need to measure
the ideological placement of Supreme Court policy output. With this
measure, we can estimate the change in the ideological placement
from the time that the signal went out to the time that the new
majority opinion mentioning federalism is handed down. Section A.2
discusses the measure of the ideological placement of cases, and
Section B tests the three hypotheses.
2. Measuring the Placement of Case Outcomes. Both legal
scholarship generally and judicial scholarship in particular have
106
become increasingly influenced by empiricism in recent years, and
that empiricism has garnered the attention of judges, legislators, and
107
the press. Nevertheless, during the last four decades of this
scholarship, scholars have not developed a sophisticated objective
measure of case outcomes.
Traditionally, judicial scholars have used the percentage of
liberal decisions to measure the Supreme Court’s outputs for any
108
given year. Therefore, a year in which 40 percent of the Court’s
decisions were liberal has been considered more conservative than a
year in which 60 percent of the Court’s decisions were liberal. There
is a problem with this measure, in that some liberal cases are more
liberal than other liberal cases. If two students took math exams, but

106. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 1–14 (2002)
(reviewing the increasing use of formal empiricism in legal analysis).
107. See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic
Debates About Statistical Measures, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 748–49 (2005) (describing increased
public notice of empirical research on judicial decisionmaking).
108. See, e.g., Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker & William J. Dixon, The Supreme Court and
Criminal Justice Disputes: A Neo-Institutional Perspective, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 825, 830–35
(1989).
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one took a calculus test and the other took an addition quiz, looking
at the percent of correct answers of each student would not be a fair
109
way of comparing their mathematical competence. Michael Bailey
reasons that comparing two judges’ percentage of liberal votes across
different “tests”—i.e. case votes—is similarly unreliable. The same
judge may vote liberally 40 percent in one Term and then vote
liberally 80 percent in another Term that presented more
conservative proposals, without changing her underlying
110
preferences.
For example, the Court may be presented with a case in which
pro-defendant litigants ask the Court to make a decision that would
set precedent disallowing any search without a warrant. If the Court
issues that ruling, it is a more liberal outcome than if the Court
disallows only some searches under certain conditions without a
warrant. Both cases would be coded as liberal according to a
dichotomous measure because both protect the defendant in
question. They are different from one another, however, because one
is more liberal than the other. Treating them as interchangeable, as
does the traditional measure of case outcomes, is unsound.
Not only is the traditional measure of case outcomes
theoretically weak in this way, but it also does not make use of all
available information. In addition to coding whether a case is liberal
or conservative, the standard judicial databases provide information
on the makeup of judicial coalitions in each case. Thus, we can use a
measure of case outcomes that aggregates the overall proclivities of
each Justice in the majority coalition as a summary of the position of
each case outcome. We use the average of the preference scores of
every Justice in the majority coalition.
The essential theory behind using this measure is that case
outcomes will be a product of negotiations among the majority
coalition. Professor Jacobi’s prior work has provided a more formal
study of the soundness of using the mean of the majority coalition as
111
a measure of case outcomes, as well as an empirical examination of
whether such a measure adequately captures the Supreme Court’s
109. We would like to thank Michael Bailey for this example.
110. See Michael A. Bailey, Comparable Preference Estimates Across Time and Institutions
for the Court, Congress and Presidency, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 433, 436–38 (2007) (elaborating on
associated problems arising from assuming direct translation of these scores across time within
an institution, as well as across institutions).
111. Tonja Jacobi, Competing Models of Judicial Coalition Formation and Case Outcome
Determination, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 411, 445 (2009).
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112

cases over the last half century. Professors Jacobi and Sag find that
the mean of the majority coalition is more sound than any other
113
existing measure of case outcomes.
Using this measure also addresses the concern that Professor
Bailey raises, because the measure implicitly captures the variation in
case facts among Court cases. If only five of the most liberal Justices
agreed with a decision, then the case was probably not an “easy
case,” in contrast to a case upon which the entire Court can
unanimously agree. If a unanimous Court agrees to a change, then
the outcome will be fairly moderate, reflecting the views of the
Court’s median Justice. But a 5–4 liberal holding will reflect the views
of the liberal Justices signing onto the opinion—that is, the holding
will reflect the views of the median Justice of the coalition.
The mean of the majority coalition has been shown to be both
formally and empirically sound, but to ensure that our results do not
stem from the use of this measure, Professor Jacobi reran our analysis
using the theoretically inferior traditional percentage liberal measure.
114
The results were substantially identical to our results.
To develop a measure of Supreme Court ideological outputs that
can be derived from an ideological continuum that is constant over
time, a valid estimate of the preferences of Supreme Court Justices is
necessary. Professors Martin and Quinn developed a measure of ideal
115
points of Supreme Court Justices, similar to sophisticated measures
116
of congressional preferences. The Justices’ ideal points are based on
a rank ordering of Justices on a constant standard, although as Martin
117
and Quinn find, these points can change over time. It is essential
that the measure rests on a standardized scale because our analysis
takes place over half a century.

112. Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, Taking the Measure of Ideology: Empirically Measuring
Supreme Court Cases, 98 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Nov. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1345982.
113. Id.
114. Jacobi, supra note 111, at 450–51. Using the percentage liberal measure, conservative
dissents move the Court in a conservative direction by 6.04 percent, and liberal dissents move
the Court in a liberal direction by 13.58 percent. Id. at 449. The p-values using this measure are
0.03 and 0.02 respectively—enough to establish the effect with confidence. Id. This is
comparable to our results, presented infra Part III.B.
115. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 92, at 134–35.
116. See POOLE & ROSENTHAL, supra note 94, at 233–49 (introducing the D-NOMINATE
scores of congressional preferences).
117. See Martin & Quinn, supra note 92, at 152.
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Professors Martin and Quinn take advantage of voting coalitions
118
to make inferences about the relative placement of Justices. A
Justice who is often a lone dissenter in conservative cases will be
ranked as more liberal than a colleague who sometimes joins that
Justice in 7–2 conservative decisions. If the colleague is rarely the
lone dissenter in conservative cases, then that colleague will be
designated as somewhat more conservative. A moderate Justice can
change places with another moderate Justice by increasing the
number of conservative or liberal votes as compared with the other
Justice. This measure provides standardized comparisons over time.
Thus, even though Justice Breyer was never on the Court with Justice
Brennan, their scores can be compared because Justice Brennan was
on the Court with other Justices who were on the Court with Justice
Breyer, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist. Therefore, the rank-order
measure simultaneously accounts for change over time and across
Justices for all years, rendering the Justices’ ideal points a
standardized comparison with one another over time.
We illustrate the Justices’ positions on the current Court in
Figure 2. The Martin-Quinn scores closely align with press and
119
popular perceptions of the Justices’ relative ideological positions.
Not only do the relative positions look about right—and thus the
Martin-Quinn scores pass the “smell test”—but the results are
consistent enough that we can refer to negative scores as liberal and
positive scores as conservative, even though Professors Martin and
Quinn do not incorporate any measure of directionality into their
scores. Unsurprisingly, then, negative (that is, liberal) Martin-Quinn

118. Id. at 147.
119. In 2004, Justice O’Connor held the position of median Justice with a Martin-Quinn
score of 0.08. With her retirement and the death of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy
has become the median Justice with a Martin-Quinn score of 0.49. Media portraits of Justice
Kennedy as the Court’s new swing vote fit very well with Professors Martin and Quinn’s
analysis. See, e.g., Robert Barnes, In Second Term, Roberts Court Defines Itself; Many 5 to 4
Decisions Reflect Narrowly Split Court That Leans Conservative, WASH. POST, June 25, 2007, at
A3; Robert Barnes, Justice Kennedy: The Highly Influential Man in the Middle; Court’s 5 to 4
Decisions Underscore His Power, WASH. POST, May 13, 2007, at A1. Historically, the most
extreme Justices on the Court since 1937 were Justice Douglas in 1974, who scored -6.33, and
then-Justice Rehnquist in 1975, who scored 4.31. When Rehnquist became Chief Justice, he
became more moderate, with an average score of 1.48. The most consistently conservative
Justice on the Court has been Justice Thomas, with a score of 3.77. The historical mean of the
Court is approximately 0. Court observers would agree that Justice Stevens is more liberal than
Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Breyer, who in turn are more liberal than Justice Kennedy. They
would also agree that Justices Alito and Roberts are more conservative than Justice Kennedy
but less conservative than Justice Scalia, who is only less conservative than Justice Thomas.
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scores correlate with a positive (that is, Democrat) coding in the
traditional party of the appointing president proxy for judicial
ideology, whereas positive/conservative Martin-Quinn scores accord
with a Republican president’s appointment of a Justice; nevertheless,
the scores provide a much more nuanced measure of judicial
120
ideology.
To measure the placement of each decision, we used these ideal
points to calculate the position of each case by computing the mean
of the Martin-Quinn ideal points of the majority coalition Justices in
each case. We then aggregate these majority coalition means for each
year and policy area. This measure is not perfectly accurate for
several reasons. First, the Justices’ relative bargaining power in
determining a case’s outcome is not clear from the decision. Second,
the measure is aggregated to the policy area from various cases;
therefore, two identical means could have different standard
deviations, making it more difficult to make inferences about the
placement of the means. Nonetheless, we believe that this measure is
a valid indication of where the Supreme Court places its policies—it
improves upon the simplistic dichotomous conception of liberal
121
versus conservative.
Now that we have shown how to place each case on an
ideological spectrum, we must also show how we aggregate these

120. See Matthew Sag, Tonja Jacobi & Maxim Sytch, Ideology and Exceptionalism in
Intellectual Property: An Empirical Study, 97 CAL. L. REV. 801, 838 (2009) (finding that when
using both Martin-Quinn scores and party of the appointing president, the Martin-Quinn scores
soak up all of the explanatory power of party of the appointing president).
121. See Jacobi & Sag, supra note 112 (showing the superiority of the mean of the majority
coalition measure to the traditional percentage liberal-conservative measure). A qualitative
analysis of the mean of the majority coalition measure also reveals that it measures the
placement of Supreme Court cases fairly well. For example, the most conservative
discrimination case on the Supreme Court’s agenda from 1953 to 2000, according to our
measure, is San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). This is
probably the case that stands out in people’s minds as one of the most conservative
discrimination cases in the period analyzed, because it allows the unequal distribution of funds
for schools, even though that distribution largely correlated with national origin. Some might
argue that this decision reverted back to a de facto discrimination that would have allowed more
discrimination than Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), which condoned “separate but
equal” treatment under the Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 550–51. The most liberal case in the
policy area of discrimination in the time frame is Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990), which
sustained a local court order allowing local officials to ignore state tax laws about raising money
for failing schools to prevent further white flight to the suburbs, id. at 33. This case was
extremely controversial, and many states requested that Congress take action to overturn the
decision. The Supreme Court finally overturned their own decision five years later in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
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cases to measure the average ideological movement for each policy
area across time. This is important because our theory relies on
finding changes in these overall aggregate trends. Figure 5 plots the
average of the mean of the majority coalition scores for all First
Amendment cases from the 1953 Term through the 1999 Term. The
x-axis is the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the average score of that
Term’s cases, using the mean of the majority coalition measure of
case outcomes. For each case, we calculate the mean of each majority
member’s ideal points and average the means across all First
Amendment Cases for the year. The plot includes information about
the standard deviation of these ideal points. This way, we can observe
that in some years, liberal members of the Court tended to be in the
majority more often, and in other years, conservative members of the
Court tended to be in the majority more often. This is true even when
the Court’s membership does not change. The lighter lines show the
standard deviations around the score of each case.
Figure 5. Average of Ideological Positions for All First
Amendment Cases at the Supreme Court, 1953–1999 Terms
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Personnel changes on the Court affect these scores. The graph
shows that the Warren Court was much more liberal on First
Amendment issues than the Burger Court. There is also, however, a
large amount of variation within natural Courts. For example, 1959
and 1960 were more conservative years on the Warren Court. And
although 1972 was the most conservative year for First Amendment
issues, the average dropped in the following years. The conservative
averages in years 1975 through 1977 were followed by a more liberal
era from 1979 through 1981. This means that even with the same (or
mostly the same) Justices on the Court, either the liberal or the
conservative coalition is tending to dominate the majority coalitions
for that year. Justices are not just changing their minds about their
preferences; instead, the nature of the questions posed to the Court
are changing. The Justices are responding to questions posed by the
litigants. As a result of these questions, moderate Justices sometimes
vote with their more conservative colleagues; at other times, the
moderate Justices vote with their liberal colleagues.
Another aspect of this figure worth noting is the striking
variation of the standard deviations of these majority coalitions.
Standard deviations measure the dispersion around the mean. When
the standard deviation is high, there is likely to be a high number of
both conservative majorities and liberal majorities, and these
majorities are more likely to be split along ideological lines in 5–4 or
6–3 outcomes. A low standard deviation could indicate many
unanimous decisions, or it could indicate that liberals or
conservatives completely dominated that year. From 1959 through
1962, the mean is more conservative compared to previous and future
years, but the standard deviation is high, showing that there are some
cases that the liberal coalition won. From 1966 through 1968, the
standard deviation was low, but the means show that the liberal
coalitions are dominating. From 1983 through 1988, there are more
moderate outcomes but very high standard deviations. This indicates
that there are many split decisions, with 5–4 or 6–3 coalitions, and
that both the liberal and conservative coalitions are winning a
significant proportion of those cases.
Our hypotheses are that signals in dissenting opinions will call
for questions that will place the dissent more often in the majority.
Liberal dissents lead to more liberal outcomes in the future, and
conservative dissents lead to more conservative outcomes in the
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122

future. Using cases dealing with judicial power, Figure 6 illustrates
the potential differences in cases’ ideological outcomes based on
123
whether the cases considered the issue of federal and state power.
The x-axis is the Term of the Court; the y-axis is the average score of
that Term’s cases, using the mean of the majority coalition measure
of case outcomes.
The first thing to notice is that, not surprisingly, these trends
vary together. Another thing to notice is that, during the Warren
Court years, the cases that are decided on the basis of federal-state
power tend to be more liberal than the average case. This tends in the
opposite direction during the Burger Court. The federal-state power
cases are at times more liberal than other cases, such as in 1962, 1964,
1967, 1971, and 1974. In other years, the federal-state power cases
were more conservative than other cases, such as in 1954, 1959, 1970,
1974 through 1976, and 1980 though 1982. This is the difference in the
outcomes that we explain: we expect that litigants responding to
signals will bring cases with particular facts and legal questions that
will, on average, benefit those Justices who signaled for these cases in
their dissents. Looking at the difference in ideological balance
between cases that are framed according to the federal-state powers
issues and those that are not will help control for the Court’s general
ideological changes across years.

122. Note that we are testing the change in the ideological dimension, not the exact position
in two-dimensional space. We are not measuring the movement within a federalism dimension;
rather, we are examining the extent to which Justices who have voted in a particular way on the
ideological dimension can be persuaded to vote differently when litigants frame the issues in
terms of federalism. Although our results in Figures 8 and 9 are suggestive that a second
federalism dimension is operative in judicial decisionmaking, our analysis does not depend on
establishing that Justices line up often enough in a consistent manner to constitute a significant
second dimension in all judicial decisionmaking. Rather, we test whether federalism is
sufficiently salient to alter outcomes in the ideological space.
123. The most common Judicial Power issues are judicial review of administrative agencies,
resolution of circuit conflict or conflict between other courts, mootness, jurisdiction, Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, writ improvidently granted, comity, personal injury, venue, private or
implied cause of action, justiciable questions, and standing.
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Figure 6. Mean of Majority Ideal Points for Judicial Power
Cases at the Supreme Court, 1953–1985
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In sum, we use a measure of the ideological placement of
Supreme Court policy outputs, aggregating Professors Martin and
Quinn’s ideal points of each Justice in the majority to get a value of
the mean of the majority coalition for each case. We then aggregate
the means across all years and policy areas from the 1953 Term
through the 1985 Term. These measures can be calculated for any
subset of cases. We look for ideological change from the time of the
signal to the cases resulting from the signal.
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B. Results
1. The Effect of Federalism Dissents on the Number of Federalism
Cases. The question we address here is whether dissenting opinions
that mention the federal-state balance of power in certain policy
areas cause litigants to reconsider how they frame their cases (or
groups to reconsider which case facts and legal arguments to choose),
resulting in an increase in majority outcomes in the same policy area
that are decided (at least partially) on the basis of state versus federal
power.
The units of analysis are the policy area for each Supreme Court
Term from 1953 through 1985. The signals and the resulting agenda
transformation are hypothesized to occur within each policy area.
The independent variable is the number of conservative and number
of liberal dissenting opinions that mention federal-state power when
the majority opinion makes no mention of federalism. We use
techniques that ensure that no error arises from the fact that we are
124
examining cases over time. We also allow for correlations that may
exist among the policy areas, and moreover, we control for the effects
of any correlation within each policy area by including policy-area
125
dummy variables.
Figure 7 shows the results for the test of hypothesis 1. The x-axis
is the time lag between the dissent’s discussion of federalism and later
majority opinions that mention federalism; the y-axis is the number of
cases resulting. The figure shows the impact of federalism dissents on
majority opinions within a 95 percent confidence interval. Figure 7
shows, as hypothesized, that the number of dissenting opinions that

124. We use Ordinary Least Squares parameter estimates with panel corrected standard
errors, according to the recommendation of Professors Beck and Katz. See Nathaniel Beck &
Jonathan N. Katz, What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data, 89 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 634, 634–35 (1995).
125. Because we are dealing with time-series data—that is, data that includes multiple years
of Court activity—we need to check that our results are not perverted by autocorrelation—that
is, regression results shaped by the internal correlation of a variable with itself over time. To
deal with autocorrelation, we include a specification for an autocorrelation term of the first
order. For example, we include a one-year-lagged version of the variable. When there are no
cases that mention federalism in the majority opinion, there is missing data on the dependent
variable. In these cases, we substituted lagged values of the dependent variable. In cases in
which there are four years of continuous missing data, we substituted the mean of the majority
opinion for all cases. This is problematic because it includes possibilities of movements that
were not caused by outcomes affected by the transformation. We therefore corroborated our
analysis using only those cases in which majority opinions mention federalism, but we use pairwise regression (otherwise, computation is impossible). The results are substantively identical.
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mention federalism in each policy area (only when the majority
makes no mention of state versus federal power) has a positive
impact on the number of subsequent majority opinions that mention
federalism. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 0.08 level
for a two-tailed test. But because we had a good theoretical reason to
expect a positive effect, there is reason to use a one-tailed test, in
which case it would be significant at the well-accepted 0.05
126
probability.
Figure 7. The Effect of Dissenting Opinions that Mention
Federalism on Majority Opinions that Mention Federalism
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Note: Estimates are Ordinary Least Square unstandardized regression coefficients and
confidence intervals are computed using panel corrected standard errors, calculated according
to Beck and Katz (1995). The dependent variable is the number of cases on the Supreme

126. When a hypothesis specifies an expected difference, but not the direction of that
difference, a two-tailed test is appropriate. But when the hypothesis includes the directionality
of the effect, a one-tailed test is appropriate. Using a 0.05 test of statistical significance under a
one-tailed test, the null hypothesis can be rejected if the value of the test statistic falls in the top
or bottom 0.05 end of the distribution, whichever was hypothesized. In contrast, under a twotailed test, the null hypothesis is rejected if the value falls in either end of the distribution, but
only if it falls in the 0.025 range. Both distributions add up to 5 percent, resulting in 95 percent
confidence in the results, but the direction of the effect under a one-tailed test must be
prespecified in the hypothesis.
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Court’s agenda that have implications for the balance of power between the states and the
federal government, across eleven policy areas from 1953–1985. The independent variable
presented here is the number of dissenting opinions that mention state-federal balance of
power, when the majority opinion does not mention federalism. The y-axis plots the slope
coefficient and the x-axis plots the lag year of the effect. Controls in this analysis include policy
area dummy variables, a Burger Court dummy, the legislative agenda, and the absolute value
change of the median Justice.

This process takes six years, which is closely consistent with
Professor Baird’s finding that politically salient decisions cause
litigation that affects the Supreme Court’s agenda four and five years
127
later. Because litigation encouraged by federalism-based signals has
a de facto prerequisite that a state or federal government actor first
act in a way that causes the case or controversy that results in
litigation (for example, by enacting legislation), it is unsurprising that
it takes on average one to two years longer for these dissenting
opinions to have an impact on future majority outcomes.
Substantially, one federalism dissent results in 0.20 later majority
opinions based on federalism. This effect is statistically significant at
128
the 0.05 level. This figure probably understates the substantive
effect for a number of reasons. First, because the Supreme Court has
discretion over granting certiorari, our results are likely to
underestimate the extent to which federalism dissents instigate future
cases, as an earlier dissent may produce many more certiorari
petitions than the Court hears. Thus, our results will capture the
minimum effect that federalism dissents provoke.
The second reason why our results may underestimate the effect
of federalism dissents is that we are testing the statistical significance
of an effect in any given year, and so our coefficients do not capture
any cases that are instigated when there is variation in the time lag.
The effect often may happen at earlier stages, with responses to the
signals in other years that simply did not achieve statistical
significance. Our results are conservative because they expect a result
that is statistically significant in a particular year; a cumulative test
would show a larger effect, but poses the danger of overinclusion. We
therefore have conducted the hardest test, and nevertheless have

127. Baird, supra note 80, at 761–66.
128. We estimated using Generalized Least Squares computing Ordinary Least Squares
with panel-corrected standard errors according to the recommendations of Professors Beck and
Katz, supra note 124, at 634–35. We specified a model that allows for correlation among the
cross sections, controlled for variation in the number of issues across policy areas by including a
dummy variable for each policy area, and included a specification for an autocorrelation term of
the first order.
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shown a result that is both statistically significant and substantially
meaningful.
Moreover, we have been as restrictive as possible in our
definitions, only allowing dissenting opinions when the majority does
not mention federalism. Concurring opinions may have an impact.
Or, there may be signals outside of the particular policy area that
have an impact we would not observe in this analysis. Because this
analysis is a conservative estimate of the impact of these signals on
the resulting agenda, we can be confident in the rigor of the results.
Thus, this first result provides strong support for the conclusion
proposed by our first hypothesis that dissents based on federalism
when the majority opinion is not based on federalism encourage
litigants to bring similar cases on federalism grounds.
2. Explaining the Supreme Court’s Ideological Movement in
Federalism Cases. Our first hypothesis was that federalism-based
dissents result in significantly more federalism-based majority
opinions in the same policy area four to six years later. Our first set of
results have supported this hypothesis. Our second hypothesis is that
conservative dissenting opinions that mention federal-state power,
when the majority opinion does not, lead to future majority opinions
that mention federal-state power and move the Court’s ideological
placement in a conservative direction. The third hypothesis states the
same for liberal dissenting opinions, which should lead to greater
liberal policy output. As a reminder, the dependent variable is a
measure of ideological movement, equaling the change in the
ideological placement of the Court’s majority opinion at year 0 (the
case in which the dissent signals for the transformation) to the
ideological placement of those cases in later years.
Our expectation, then, is that a federalism-based dissenting
opinion at year 0 leads to a significant movement in the ideological
placement of cases in that policy area at approximately year 6, when
the majority opinion recognizes the case’s implications for federal
versus state power. It would be disconfirming to see large movements
in years 0 through 3. This is a conservative test, as some signals could
result in cases earlier than six years, particularly if litigants reframe
those cases in response to the signal at an earlier stage—for example,
between phases of litigation.
A positive value is a move in the dependent variable—the
overall average of the mean of the majority coalitions in a given area
of law in any year—in a conservative direction. A negative value
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indicates a move in a liberal direction. Thus, liberal dissents should
cause negative movements and conservative dissents should cause
positive movements. Ideological change ranges from -2.15 to 2.59.
The mean of the dependent variable is 0.11 and the standard
deviation is 0.74. There is considerable variation in the position of the
Court’s case outcomes over time.
Much of this change may have to do with a change in the
placement of the median Justice due to, for example, replacements on
the Court. For this reason, we control for this change by including a
variable equal to the median Justice’s ideal point. Using this control is
advantageous because it accounts for various causes of median
change, including judicial replacement, judicial attitude shifts over
time, and changes in the political administration or Congress.
Because of the many ways in which the Court’s median can change,
and because we want to fully ensure that our findings do not stem
from ideological changes on the Court, we also include lags of the
absolute value change in the median Justice’s ideal point for each
year.
Due to insufficient data, we must exclude from these analyses
some of the eleven policy areas the Supreme Court considers. If the
entire time period had fewer than two dissenting opinions that
mention federalism when the majority opinion did not, we deleted the
policy area from the analysis. In the analysis of the effect of
conservative dissenting signals, we do not exclude any policy areas; in
the analysis of the effect of liberal dissenting signals, we exclude the
policy areas of privacy, environment, and labor.
a. The Conservative Hypothesis. Figure 8 presents the results of
the analysis of conservative dissenting opinions. The effect of liberal
dissents is shown below. Running the tests in one regression has
identical results. We present them separately here for clarity in the
direction of the movement of the dependent variable for each type of
signal. It shows the change in the direction of the Court’s placement
over a six-year time period. The x-axis is the time lag between a
federalism dissent and a later majority opinion, and the y-axis is the
estimated effect of the signal on the mean of the majority coalitions.
The center line shows the movement in case outcomes over time; the
two outer lines are the 95 percent confidence intervals. Thus, there is
a significant effect on the placement of Supreme Court cases in a year
when the confidence interval lies entirely above the x-axis.
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Figure 8. The Effect of Conservative Dissenting Opinions on the
Change in the Ideological Placement of the Supreme Court’s Policy
Outputs that Mention Federal Versus State Power
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Note: Estimates are Ordinary Least Square unstandardized regression coefficients and
confidence intervals are computed using panel corrected standard errors, calculated according
to Beck and Katz (1995). The dependent variable is the ideological placement of the Supreme
Court’s cases in which the majority opinion mentions the balance of power between the states
and the federal government, across eleven policy areas from 1953–1985. The independent
variable presented here is the number of conservative dissenting opinions that mention
federalism when the majority opinion does not mention federalism. The y-axis plots the slope
coefficient and the x-axis plots the lag year of the effect. Controls in this analysis include policy
area dummy variables, a Burger Court dummy, the legislative agenda, and the absolute value
change of the median Justice.

As discussed, conservative movements are positive and liberal
movements are negative. Thus, Figure 8 shows that six years after a
conservative dissenting signal that mentions federal-state powers,
there is a significant movement in the overall placement of Supreme
Court cases in any given policy area. Additionally, in the fifth year
after the conservative dissenting signal, there is a distinct movement
in a conservative direction, but this effect does not rise to the point of
statistical significance. The effect in the fifth year is nonetheless
important. Because we predicted an effect in the sixth year, but
anticipated that an effect could arise as early as the fourth or fifth
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year, the effect on the fifth and sixth year combined is even more
substantively significant. At any rate, the effect on the sixth year is
both substantively and statistically significant in the direction we
hypothesized.
b. The Liberal Hypothesis. A skeptic looking at Figure 8 may
think that federal-state power is really just a façade for conservative
arguments. We find, however, that the effect we identify in Figure 8 is
not limited to conservative dissents. In Figure 9, we see a similar
effect for liberal dissents; in fact, the effect is even greater. Once
again, in the sixth year after a liberal dissent mentions federal-state
power when the majority does not, the overall Court outcomes in that
area of the law move in a significantly liberal direction. In the case of
liberal dissents, case outcomes in the fifth year are considerably more
liberal than in year 0, and even more so in the fourth year. Once
again, the other-year effects are not statistically significant; but once
again, they dilute the extent to which we can measure the impact on
the sixth year. Nonetheless, liberal dissents that mention federalism
cause a statistically significant move in a liberal direction in the
Court’s overall policy outputs six years after the dissenting signal.
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Figure 9. The Effect of Liberal Dissenting Opinions on the
Change in the Ideological Placement of the Supreme Court’s Policy
Outputs that Mention Federal Versus State Power
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Note: Estimates are Ordinary Least Square unstandardized regression coefficients and
confidence intervals are computed using panel corrected standard errors, calculated according
to Beck and Katz (1995). The dependent variable is the ideological placement of the Supreme
Court’s cases in which the majority opinion mentions the balance of power between the states
and the federal government, across eight policy areas from 1953–1985. The independent
variable presented here is the number of liberal dissenting opinions that mention federalism
when the majority opinion does not mention federalism. The y-axis plots the slope coefficient
and the x-axis plots the lag year of the effect. The policy areas of privacy, environment, and
labor are excluded because there were fewer than two instances of liberal dissenting opinions
that mention federalism when the majority opinion does not. Controls in this analysis include
policy area dummy variables, a Burger Court dummy, the legislative agenda, and the absolute
value change of the median Justice.

Another concern may be that federalism simply is becoming
more important over time. To confirm that our results were not a
product of a general increase in the importance of federalism over
time, we included a linear time control variable. This variable was not
significant. Thus, our results are not driven by some jurisprudential
change in federalism itself over time.
3. The Magnitude of the Impact. The results are as we
hypothesized for both conservative and liberal dissents: conservative
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dissents that mention federal-state powers move case outcomes in a
conservative (positive) direction, and liberal dissents cause moves in
a liberal (negative) direction. This effect is statistically significant at
the 0.05 level in both analyses, as expected, after six years. The time
trends have the shape expected: minimal effects in years 0 through 3,
some effects in years 4 through 5, and statistically significant
movements in both conservative and liberal directions six years after
a conservative or liberal dissenting signal, respectively. As
anticipated, the effect drops off again in years 7 and 8, after the
signals have achieved their purpose.
Thus, all three hypotheses are supported by findings of
statistically significant effects in the directions predicted. But are
these effects substantively significant? To answer this question, we
need to put the movements measured in Figures 8 and 9 into context.
A dissent based on federalism moves the overall direction of the
Supreme Court in a given policy area after six years by 0.14 for
conservative dissents and 0.22 for liberal dissents. The standard
deviation of the change in the overall Court’s position over the thirtythree years studied is approximately 0.74. This means that a
federalism-based dissent moves outcomes by approximately onefourth or more of the standard deviation of the whole scale. This
makes the effect extremely large.
We can break down our results further, taking into account the
effect of different-sized majority coalitions. The above results were
for tests run on cases for all-sized majority coalitions. But we would
expect that 8–1 and 7–2 majorities would typically be too stable to be
overturned easily by transformation onto a procedural dimension
(there are of course no dissenting signals for 9–0 majorities). In
contrast, we would expect much more significant effects on a closer
case, in which it should be easier to overturn majorities by
transforming the case into one about federal-state powers. Running
the same tests for only 5–4 and 6–3 majorities produces even stronger
results than those shown in Figures 8 and 9. Conservative dissenting
signals move Supreme Court outcomes in a conservative direction by
0.29 for 5–4 and 6–3 majorities. Liberal dissenting signals move
majority outcomes in a liberal direction by 0.25 for 5–4 and 6–3
129
majorities.
Though we present the effects of liberal and
conservative dissents on case outcome movement separately, we
129. The effect of conservative signals is significant beyond 99 percent confidence; the effect
of liberal signals just approaches significance with 94 percent confidence.
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again also tested the effect of liberal and conservative dissents in the
same model. These effects are substantively identical.
Altogether, our results provide strong support for both
ideological movement hypotheses, as well as for the general
proposition that dissenting signals can transform the basis on which
litigants argue future cases. Not only do dissents based on federalstate powers result in significantly more cases being argued on that
basis in the relevant substantive policy area, but signaling provides
Justices who were previously on the losing side of an issue with an
opportunity to create winning coalitions. In this way, dissenting
Justices can move the overall direction of case outcomes in a given
policy area in their preferred direction.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
We find that dissenting opinions that mention a case’s
implications for federal-state powers implicitly suggest to like-minded
litigants possible ways to frame cases to win over a majority of
Justices. We also find that this strategy crosses ideological bounds.
Both liberal and conservative Justices use this strategy, and it is
effective for both. Federalism is not simply a façade for conservatism;
both liberal and conservative dissents move policy outcomes in their
favored direction, precisely in those cases that mention federalism in
later majority opinions. Thus, dissenting signals based on federalism
succeed at moving policy in the dissenting coalition’s favored
direction.
These findings suggest that the historical illustrations we present
in this Article are not anomalous. Furthermore, although our primary
example about Bacon’s park is one in which the same litigants
responded to the signal to achieve a different outcome, our results
show that signaling has value beyond the bounds of relitigation of the
same dispute. Signals can cause a new chain of events in a different
circumstance to bring about litigation framed in a specific way. These
results have significant implications in a variety of areas, including:
the phenomenon of judicial signaling, the use of issue fluidity, the
importance of federalism, the nature of judicial behavior, litigant
responsiveness to that behavior, and judicial agenda setting.
First, our findings confirm that judicial signaling occurs and is a
powerful tool for Justices to shape both their agendas and the
outcome of cases. Signaling shapes judicial agendas by encouraging
litigants to bring cases of the type and on the terms that the Justices

BAIRD-JACOBI IN FINAL.DOC

236

10/6/2009 6:28:09 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 59:183

desire. The results confirm that six years after the original dissenting
federalism signal, there is a significant increase in cases arguing the
issue on federalism grounds. Signaling also shapes the outcome of
later cases by allowing the Justices to propose alternative grounds on
which to decide cases. These grounds have been shown to provide
means of undermining previous majorities and reversing earlier
outcomes. Liberal dissenting signals result in future cases decided in a
liberal direction; conservative dissenting signals result in future cases
decided in a conservative direction.
Second, although our results in no way disprove or discredit the
notion of issue fluidity, they do show that dissenting Justices often
have other options available to them to achieve alternative outcomes.
Even if the Justices can manipulate the issues of cases presented to
them, they may well be more likely to persuade their colleagues to
join them when those issues are framed by litigants, rather than
invented by the Justices themselves. Given the normative constraints
that operate against the use of issue fluidity, it is unsurprising that
signaling has been shown to be a tool often used by the Justices.
Third, our results suggest the importance of federalism in
Supreme Court jurisprudence as an alternative means of deciding
cases across the spectrum of issue categories. Additionally, these
results indicate the manipulative power of federalism. It has been
shown that Justices regularly use federalism as an alternative means
of deciding cases within those categories, and as a means of achieving
the reverse outcome in a case decided on the basis of the substantive
issue of law.
But our results have significance beyond federalism. Although
dissenting federalism signals occur in only 1 percent of cases, we have
identified a phenomenon that may be utilized in other areas. This
includes judicial attempts to destabilize a majority through other
means, whether through procedural means such as standing, or
through an alternative substantive dimension. More generally, our
results show that the way in which litigants frame cases is highly
determinative of the cases’ outcomes. This lends support to various
analyses of judicial interpretive methods—such as Professor Brest’s
contention that manipulation of the level of generality of a legal
130
question is highly determinative of its answer —and it opens the
door to future studies of other means of fracturing majority opinions.
130. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1078–85 (1981).
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Fourth, our findings show that a form of strategic judicial
behavior—signaling to litigants in the hope of manipulating the
Court’s agenda—occurs and is highly effective in shaping case
outcomes. This contributes to and corroborates previous judicial
scholarship regarding strategic models of the agenda-setting process.
Strategic models of the certiorari process show that when Justices
decide to grant certiorari to a case, they take the preferences of their
131
fellow members of the Court into consideration. The implication of
this prior scholarship and our findings is that Justices, though
motivated by their own policy preferences, account for their
colleagues’ preferences in their strategies and have an incentive to
take the pivotal Justice’s preferences into consideration when
deciding whether to grant certiorari. Our analysis expands this
approach, illustrating that there can be more than one pivotal Justice
in any case because multiple dimensions of an issue potentially
influence judicial preferences.
Fifth, although we do not test this hypothesis directly, our results
imply that litigants are highly responsive to Justices’ signals. Dissents
referring to federalism result in a statistically significant increase in
later cases on a given issue that are decided on federalism grounds,
allowing dissenting judges to garner new majorities.
Sixth, this Article begins to integrate models of agenda setting
that previously have been applied only to Congress, and applies them
to the Supreme Court. Though political scientists have accumulated
substantial knowledge about the relationship between agenda control
132
and congressional outcomes, many of these theories have not yet
been applied to the Supreme Court. One reason for this failure to
apply congressional theories to the Supreme Court is that the rules of
the agenda-setting process in Congress are very different from those
in the Supreme Court. In congressional agenda-setting models, there
is an agenda setter, usually a congressional committee, that is
responsible for bringing the “yea” or “nay” proposal to the floor.

131. See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 56–111; Boucher & Segal, supra note 59, at
829–36; Krol & Brenner, supra note 66, at 336; Jan Palmer, An Econometric Analysis of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decisions, 39 PUB. CHOICE 387, 387–90 (1982).
132. See, e.g., JAMES M. ENELOW & MELVIN J. HINICH, THE SPATIAL THEORY OF VOTING:
AN INTRODUCTION 131–68 (1984); Richard D. McKelvey & Norman Schofield, Generalized
Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point, 55 ECONOMETRICA 923, 923–33 (1987); Thomas Romer
& Howard Rosenthal, Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo, 33
PUB. CHOICE 27, 27–29 (1978); Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional
Foundations of Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85, 85–92, 100–02 (1987).
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Often, the setter must take the preferences of the legislature’s median
voter into consideration when deciding the substance of the yea or
nay question. Our theory suggests that strategic litigants are the
agenda setters, somewhat analogous to congressional committees.
Strategic Justices, analogous to the legislative body, provide clues
about which questions to bring. This may open a diverse set of
questions about the relationship between strategic litigants, the
Justices on the Court, and the Court’s agenda.
Probably the most important outcome of this analysis is its
implications for future research. If signals about federalism can
inspire future litigation, then there are perhaps other ways to signal in
dissenting opinions so that litigants frame cases in the manner that
the dissenting Justices would like them framed. As mentioned,
signaling need not be limited to federalism. Moreover, signaling may
not be restricted to dissenting opinions, but may occur in other forms,
such as concurrences. Judges may even signal to other judges in other
courts—higher court judges may send signals to lower courts as part
of hierarchical control, or lower courts may signal cases worthy of
133
reconsideration. Additionally, judges may signal to outside actors.
134
For example lower court judges may signal for promotion purposes,
or Justices may send signals to the Senate about the Court’s overall
position when the Senate is considering Supreme Court
135
nominations. Judicial signaling may occur in a variety of contexts,
with interesting implications for the content of other areas of
Supreme Court policymaking and for our understanding of judicial
behavior.

133. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, Speaking Up: A Model of Judicial
Dissent and Discretionary Review, 14 S. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 2–7 (2006).
134. See Andrew P. Morriss, Michael Heise & Gregory C. Sisk, Signaling and Precedent in
Federal District Court Opinions, 13 S. CT. ECON. REV. 63, 64–69 (2005).
135. Alvaro Bustos & Tonja Jacobi, Strategic Judicial Preference Revelation: Signaling in
Judicial Nominations 2–5 (Jan. 8, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Duke Law
Journal).

